by Michael Hollister
Exclusive published at Michael Hollister on September 14, 2026
4.687 words * about 25 minutes readingtime
On July 02, 2026, the European Court of Justice ruled that a single individual who republishes videos from the Russian broadcaster RT on a freely accessible website falls within the scope of the European distribution ban – even if he earns nothing from it and finances his site entirely through donations. Between 2022 and 2023, the operator in the underlying case received around 60,000 euros in voluntary contributions; the Saarbrücken public prosecutor’s office investigated him and 2 other individuals on suspicion of forming a criminal organization under Section 129 of the German Criminal Code. The Court interpreted the term “operator” broadly: It also covers a private individual who makes prohibited content accessible, regardless of whether that person profits from it. The legal basis is EU Regulation 833/2014 in the version in force since March 2022; criminal liability arises under Germany’s Foreign Trade and Payments Act, which in turn provides the predicate for the allegation under Section 129. In January 2025, the Saarbrücken Regional Court referred the interpretive question to the European Court of Justice because it was unclear whether an individual blogger with no commercial interest fell under the regulation at all. The answer from Luxembourg was that he did. A donation-funded publisher thereby loses the protection that freedom of expression would otherwise afford an individual statement.
The same calendar records a second development that, at first glance, has nothing to do with the first. Since January 01, 2026, federal ministries have been funding 15 media-company projects devoted to identifying and countering “digital disinformation.” Among the 6 most heavily funded initiatives are several run by Deutsche Welle and one subproject involving the investigative organization CORRECTIV. The state thus prohibits the distribution of one media outlet’s content all the way down to a donation-funded private blog – while simultaneously co-financing the technical apparatus through which other media organizations identify and classify disinformation. Each development is documented, public, and undisputed in its own right. Placed side by side, they raise a question that is rarely asked in Germany’s debate over media funding.
The Question Rarely Asked in the Funding Debate
The question is not whether disinformation exists – it does, and the funded sector regularly documents it. Nor is the question whether the state may fund research. It may. The question is more precise and less comfortable: When a state uses public funds to co-finance the fight against “disinformation” at the very organizations that themselves decide what qualifies as disinformation, is that research funding – or the construction of an infrastructure that will later be operated by private but publicly subsidized actors?
The dividing line does not run between clean and dirty work. It runs between 2 readings of the same process. Under one reading, the funding supports a discrete research project that has nothing to do with the recipient’s editorial work. Under the other, it provides the foundation for a tool that subsequently enters the recipient’s day-to-day editorial operations. Which reading is correct depends not on the intentions of those involved, which no outsider can know with certainty, but on the restrictions governing the funds and the design of the systems being financed. Both can be traced through the primary documents.
The sober question of interests takes the analysis further than any speculation. A government that wants to influence which information is considered reliable in the public sphere needs neither censorship laws nor an agency of its own. It is enough for the tools that sort truth from falsehood to be created and operated where public funding and private interpretive authority converge. That does not establish that such an interest is actually being pursued in this case – only that the emerging structure could serve it. This possibility is precisely what makes the boundary drawn by the government and the recipients the decisive test.
15 Projects, 6 Names, 1 Guideline
The figures come from a response by the German Federal Government. Answering a written question from Nicole Hess, a member of the Alternative for Germany parliamentary group, Minister of State Wolfram Weimer disclosed on May 27, 2026, which media projects had received funding since the beginning of the year. The response is documented in Bundestag Printed Paper 21/6164. It identifies 15 projects and lists the 6 largest, including the funding recipient, title, duration, and amount awarded.
At the top of the list is CORRECTIV, with a subproject in the joint initiative “Culturally Sensitive AI Assistance for a Disinformation-Resilient Multilingual Society,” abbreviated kuKI. The federal government is providing 720,418 euros for this subproject, which runs from March 2026 through March 2029. Another 2 of the 6 projects belong to Deutsche Welle: “PADSE,” an initiative to detect deepfakes and manipulated audio recordings, funded with 428,290 euros, and “CleanFeed,” a disinformation-defense project funded with 502,230 euros. These 3 projects operate under the same funding guideline issued by the Federal Ministry of Research, Technology and Space, titled “Trust in Democracy and the State: Identifying and Countering Digital Disinformation” and published in the Federal Gazette on July 19, 2024.
The remaining 3 of the 6 major allocations also involve Deutsche Welle, this time funded by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development: 3 regional programs for Latin America, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East and North Africa, each endowed with around 6.1 million euros and scheduled to run through 2029. These 3 programs alone total more than 18 million euros. According to the questioners, Deutsche Welle projects receive around 19 million euros in total – a sum whose relationship to the broadcaster’s reduced allocation in the 2026 federal budget was expressly raised by the Alternative for Germany parliamentary group in a separate question.
The distribution across ministries is already noteworthy. The information was provided by Minister of State Weimer in his capacity as the Federal Government Commissioner for Culture and the Media, but the money itself comes from 2 other ministries – the research ministry for the 3 AI and detection projects, and the development ministry for the international programs. Funding for media companies in the name of combating disinformation is therefore spread across several ministries, making an overall view more difficult; the Federal Government has yet to submit a regular, consolidated overview of such funding to parliament. The scale is nevertheless clear: The lion’s share flows into the international programs of a public broadcaster, while the more technically demanding disinformation tools receive funding in the mid-6-figure range. CORRECTIV appears with a single subproject – but it is the one that gives rise to the central question, because a private investigative organization that publishes fact-checks itself is receiving public research funds for a disinformation tool.
What the Guideline Requires
The July 19, 2024, funding guideline is formally an instrument of research support. It is embedded in the Federal Government’s framework program for IT-security research, which operates under the heading “Digital. Secure. Sovereign.” and expressly identifies strengthening democracy as one of its strategic objectives. The guideline is administered through the project management agency VDI/VDE Innovation + Technik. Funding is awarded as non-repayable grants under the Federal Budget Code, within the framework set by European state-aid law. Eligible applicants include universities, non-university research institutions, associations, registered organizations, and nonprofit entities. A nonprofit company such as CORRECTIV falls within the eligible group, and the ministry says selection takes place through a competitive process involving external, independent reviewers. Up to this point, the process resembles thousands of other federal research grants – and nothing about this structure is, in itself, unusual or unlawful.
The decisive passage goes beyond pure basic research. The guideline requires a clear practical application. Projects developing a solution must explain how it can be implemented after the project ends and what incentive potential users would have to adopt it – ideally by including an application partner in the research consortium from the outset. The guideline explicitly names methods, processes, and tools that can prevent, identify, and counter disinformation as its intended outputs.
The restriction on the use of the funds is therefore narrower than the term “research funding” suggests. The government is not funding abstract reflection on disinformation, but the development of operational tools intended to be used afterward by an application partner involved in the project. The project documents identify that user. This is precisely where the seam lies between what the government calls research and what serves as an operational resource in daily practice – and that seam is marked in the documents themselves, not read into them by interpretation.
From noFake to kuKI: Research That Enters Operations
The pattern is not new. kuKI has a direct predecessor called noFake, funded from December 2021 through November 2024 with 1.31 million euros, entirely from federal funds under the same IT-security framework program. The consortium included Ruhr University Bochum as coordinator, TU Dortmund University, Technische Universität Berlin – and CORRECTIV. The product of this funding was neither a paper nor a study, but a platform: CORRECTIV.Faktenforum, a crowdsourcing environment in which people without journalistic training can participate in fact-checks under supervision, supported by an AI assistance system.
The noFake project description openly sets out the system’s design. An AI-assisted system prescreens large volumes of data and sorts suspicious material for subsequent review. Within the consortium, Ruhr University Bochum contributed technical signal processing, while TU Dortmund University provided expertise in journalism and media law; CORRECTIV supplied editorial practice and the platform on which trained volunteers without journalistic qualifications also participate in the review. According to the project description, the research findings, combined with the application partner’s journalistic expertise, feed into the development of this assistance system, which is integrated into a news platform. The application partner was CORRECTIV; the news platform was Faktenforum. Public research funding therefore resulted not in a finding that could be read in an academic journal, but in an active editorial tool that continues to operate after the project has ended.
kuKI continues and expands this tool. The overall project has a budget of 3.18 million euros and is funded by the Federal Ministry of Research, Technology and Space. It is coordinated by the FZI Research Center for Information Technology under the direction of Jonas Fegert. Alongside CORRECTIV, the consortium includes the Center for Monitoring, Analysis and Strategy, or CeMAS, Trier University, and Goethe University Frankfurt. Nor is kuKI an isolated case: It is 1 of 11 research consortia launched simultaneously under the ministry’s new funding initiative, “Disinformation – Detect. Understand. Counter.” The state is not building a single tool here, but an entire workshop.
The Assistant That Plugs Into Faktenforum
The official project information also states what kuKI is intended to produce. The goal is an AI assistant capable of identifying and classifying disinformation in German, Russian, and Turkish and supporting countermeasures. FZI describes the project’s visible outcome as an AI assistant that CORRECTIV will connect “to CORRECTIV.Faktenforum.” According to the project description, citizens can use Faktenforum to submit suspected disinformation themselves, discuss it, and conduct research under CORRECTIV’s editorial guidance; automated translation is intended to make this exchange possible in 3 languages. At the same time, the Center for Monitoring, Analysis and Strategy, under managing director Josef Holnburger, is expanding its existing monitoring to Russian- and Turkish-language channels on Telegram, YouTube, and TikTok in order to analyze narrative patterns, networks of actors, and distribution pathways across linguistic communities. A knowledge graph is also to be created to reveal connections among campaigns, sources, and dissemination channels. Several research components thus become a connected monitoring and analysis infrastructure.
This closes the chain. Under a guideline that requires practical relevance and an application partner to operate the result, the federal government is funding a project whose declared output is an operational AI assistant connected to the fact-checking platform of the very application partner that also runs its own fact-checking newsroom. It is at this transition – from funded development to an editorial tool used in operations – that the 2 readings diverge. One side sees discrete research; the other sees a publicly co-financed infrastructure of interpretive authority. The system’s design alone does not settle the question, but it makes the question impossible to avoid.
The choice of languages is striking. The fact that the assistant is specifically intended to cover Russian and Turkish points to the information spaces being targeted: Russian- and Turkish-speaking communities in Germany. In a second parliamentary inquiry, documented as Bundestag Printed Paper 21/7520, the Alternative for Germany parliamentary group expressly asked which federal or state authorities would receive future access to the project’s results, tools, and datasets, and how the government would ensure that legitimate expressions of opinion were not labeled as disinformation. The Federal Government’s response to these questions was not yet available at the time of research. The questions themselves, however, identify the fault lines at which a research tool could become an observation structure.
The Government’s Rebuttal
At this point, the Federal Government’s counterargument is not merely permissible, but necessary – and it is substantive. In response to earlier inquiries along the same lines, the government repeatedly stated that it does not finance CORRECTIV’s operations, but awards discrete, clearly delineated project grants unrelated to the recipient’s editorial reporting. In the response documented as Bundestag Printed Paper 20/12475, the government states that, to preserve the media’s independence from the state, neither journalistic content nor the operations or newsrooms of private media organizations receive funding. The crucial sentence reads: “Investigations, fact-checking, and editorial work are not funded.” Cross-subsidization of journalistic content, the government says, is effectively precluded by grant and state-aid law; institutional safeguards protect independence from the state.
The Federal Ministry of Research has also justified the specific kuKI grant on the grounds that it is intended to strengthen research, development, and innovative capacity in identifying and countering disinformation. The projects and partners, it said, were chosen through a competitive process involving external, independent reviewers. Asked whether the funding remained appropriate after the Berlin court ruling against CORRECTIV, the ministry responded in deliberately restrained terms. The minister said it was an expression of the strength of the rule of law that journalistic actors submit to judicial review and that decisions can be examined through the available appellate process.
This argument carries weight. It draws a formal line between funding a research tool and financing editorial content, and that line is real under grant law. Anyone criticizing the arrangement must take it seriously. The objection to the government’s reading is not that it is untrue, but that it stops too soon: A tool expressly developed for, and deplhttps://www.buymeacoffee.com/MichaelHollisteroyed in, the recipient’s editorial operations can be separated from editorial work only on paper. The grant does not finance an article – but it finances the instrument through which future articles will be produced.
How CORRECTIV Explains Its Independence
CORRECTIV itself must also be heard, and the organization has set out its position in detail. CORRECTIV is organized as a nonprofit company and says it is financed through 3 pillars: donations, grants from foundations and institutions, and its own commercial activities. According to CORRECTIV’s financial disclosure, government grants are always published, regardless of their amount, together with the name of the awarding body. The much-discussed Meta fact-checking program is not handled through the nonprofit entity, but through a commercial subsidiary. Above all stands the principle the organization states succinctly: “No one influences our editorial work.”
This transparency is verifiable and practiced; government grants are disclosed, not concealed. The organization also notes that public funds typically support educational and participatory formats, while its core investigative newsroom is financed through donations and foundation grants; its original startup funding came from a private foundation, not the state. CORRECTIV argues that the funded projects serve media education and research rather than its core editorial work, and that the technical assistance merely expands the reach of civic participation without affecting editorial responsibility. The reviewers in the grant process, it adds, were selected on the basis of professional expertise, not politics. The counterposition is therefore not that of an actor with something to hide, but that of an organization that documents its funding and draws the distinction itself. The reader has both columns before them: the self-description as discrete research and media education, and the project documents showing that the publicly funded tool will be connected to the organization’s own fact-checking platform. Which description better captures the arrangement remains the open question of this article.
The Fact-Checker in Court
The question of public co-financing for a fact-checker gains another layer because the same fact-checker is under legal pressure. On March 17, 2026, Berlin Regional Court II granted an injunction sought by Gerrit Huy, a member of the Bundestag for the Alternative for Germany, against CORRECTIV and several individuals working for the organization. The case concerned 2 articles about the meeting held in Potsdam in November 2023. The court prohibited 3 individual statements – and, unlike earlier proceedings over secondary aspects, this decision concerned the investigation’s central formulation.
At issue was the claim that a “master plan to expel German citizens” had been negotiated in Potsdam. The Regional Court classified this statement as an assertion of fact and found it untrue: The presentation discussed at the meeting had concerned neither the revocation of citizenship nor the expulsion or deportation of German citizens. The court also prohibited the related characterization of the proposal as an unconstitutional plan because such an assessment required an accurate factual core. What the court expressly did not say is noteworthy: It did not dispute the existence of a master plan as such; the sole point of contention was whether it involved the expulsion of citizens.
Precision is everything here. The claim that a court classified the Potsdam investigation in its entirety as disinformation is untenable and misrepresents the decision. Equally untenable is the opposite attempt to minimize the ruling as a rebuke of merely incidental wording – the court objected to the most consequential formulation in the entire coverage. There is another qualification: The judgment is not final, an appeal remains possible, and the legal classification is disputed. CORRECTIV’s counsel considers the wording a permissible expression of opinion that readers would understand as an evaluative summary. Courts had already considered the same passage: In parallel proceedings, the Hamburg Regional Court reached a partly different assessment and gave less weight to empirical evidence about how the media coverage had been received. Whether the statement constitutes opinion or an assertion of fact therefore remains an open legal question for the appellate courts to resolve. Legal analysis of the Berlin ruling supports a narrower finding: An organization receiving public funds to counter disinformation has at the same time been found by a court – in a judgment that is not final – to have disseminated an untrue assertion of fact in the most consequential passage of its reporting. The parliamentary opposition was not alone in identifying this contradiction; voices in the center-right and conservative spectrum also marked it as politically noteworthy.
2 Standards, 1 Ban
This brings the argument back to its starting point. While the state co-finances tools for detecting disinformation on one side, it is drawing the boundaries of permissible speech ever more tightly on the other. The ban on distributing RT content dates back to an EU regulation adopted in March 2022; following the European Court of Justice’s July 02, 2026, decision, it now extends to an individual donation-funded blog. At almost the same time, the Berlin Administrative Court upheld the prohibition of RT programming in Germany on June 30, 2026. A legal analysis by the Institute of European Media Law noted that this broad interpretation entails substantial restrictions on freedom of expression and information because even an individual blogger loses content-based protection for the specific statement.
The irony of this double standard is documented in the funded fact-checker’s own research. A February 16, 2026, CORRECTIV.Faktencheck analysis found that, almost 4 years after the ban, RT Deutschland remained readily accessible from Germany through more than 20 mirror domains and received several million visits per month; for January 2025, an analytics service estimated that these domains had attracted around 2.6 million visits. Most of the public prosecutor’s offices surveyed said that no investigations had been opened. RT Deutschland linked to this finding and interpreted it as evidence of its own reach.
Placed side by side, the result is uneven. A state broadcaster’s mirror sites, accessed millions of times, remain effectively uninvestigated because no authority considers itself responsible – jurisdiction lies with local public prosecutor’s offices where the respective internet provider is based, and they act only when a violation is reported to them. An individual citizen, by contrast, becomes a case for state-security investigators after sharing the same content on a donation-funded website. The difference does not lie in the reach of the prohibited material – the individual blog’s reach is negligible compared with that of the professionally operated mirror sites – but in the vulnerability of the target. The large, anonymous distribution apparatus evades enforcement; the identifiable individual becomes the test case in which the European Court of Justice authoritatively defines the ban’s scope. The state therefore has the means to stop distribution, but deploys them in a highly selective manner. Where the capacity to act is documented but the intention behind it remains unproven, the distinction governing this entire field applies: Capability is a finding; intent remains an open question.
The Conflict Runs Both Ways
It would be one-sided to portray this mechanism as a German or European peculiarity. The conflict between states and the opposing side’s media operates as a mirror image. Russia immediately answered Germany’s February 2022 ban on RT Deutschland by banning Deutsche Welle broadcasts, closing its Moscow bureau, and revoking its accreditations. That same year, Moscow designated Deutsche Welle a “foreign agent”; in December 2025 came its classification as an “undesirable organization”, making every form of cooperation a criminal offense.
CORRECTIV is also on that list. On October 10, 2025, the Russian Ministry of Justice declared the investigative organization an “undesirable foreign organization.” Since then, even routine journalistic acts can be punishable in Russia: forwarding an article, translating a text, or commenting on content on social media. CORRECTIV’s publishing director called the designation an attack on independent journalism. The same organization whose public co-financing is debated critically at home therefore faces the allegation abroad that it is an instrument of foreign influence – an allegation it firmly rejects.
The chronology demonstrates reciprocity even in the sequence of events. Germany’s February 2022 ban on RT Deutschland was followed within days by the closure of Deutsche Welle’s Moscow bureau; European diplomats expressly maintained at the time that Germany’s action against RT and Russia’s action against Deutsche Welle were unrelated – while Moscow cited precisely that relationship as its justification. Four years later, each side has its own catalogue: a distribution ban, foreign-agent status, designation as undesirable, and criminal penalties for cooperation.
The pattern is identical on both sides: The state prohibits or criminalizes the foreign opposing outlet while funding or protecting its own. Anyone who regards one action as legitimate protection against influence operations must explain why the mirror-image action by the other side should be judged differently. Anyone who regards it as an attack on press freedom must apply the same standard in both directions. The double standard lies not in the act of one government or the other, but in both sides’ claim that their own action constitutes protection while the opponent’s identical action constitutes censorship.
Finding
What remains at the end is not a verdict, but a structure. Under a guideline requiring the practical use of research results, the federal government is financing the development of an AI tool that will be connected to the fact-checking platform of an organization that itself decides what constitutes disinformation – and that, at the same time, has been found by a court, in a judgment that is not final, to have made an untrue assertion of fact in the most consequential investigation it has published. At the same time, the same state is extending the ban on the opposing broadcaster all the way to a private donation-funded blog, while mirror sites carrying the same broadcaster’s content and attracting millions of visits remain uninvestigated. Each of these developments is supported by primary sources. None proves intent.
Anyone who arranges the evidence obtains a chain, not causality. At its beginning is a guideline requiring the practical application of research; in the middle, a tool that plugs into a private fact-checking platform; at the end, a ban that pursues the opposing voice down to the private blog while leaving the major distributor alone. Every link in the chain is individually explicable, benign, and supported by law. Only their sum produces an architecture in which public money, private interpretive authority, and selective criminal enforcement interlock. Whether this architecture was planned or is the unplanned product of many individual decisions cannot be inferred from the documents – and that is the point at which serious analysis ends and speculation begins.
The government says it does not finance editorial work, but discrete research. The project documents say that the result of the research will be connected to the newsroom. Both statements stand side by side, and both are true. What the reader makes of them is up to the reader – but the measure should be what is done, not what is said. An old rule of thumb has proved useful in situations like this: Don’t listen to what they say – watch what they do.
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About the Author
Michael Hollister
is a geopolitical analyst and investigative journalist. He served six years in the German military, including peacekeeping deployments in the Balkans (SFOR, KFOR), followed by 14 years in IT security management. His analysis draws on primary sources to examine European militarization, Western intervention policy, and shifting power dynamics across Asia. A particular focus of his work lies in Southeast Asia, where he investigates strategic dependencies, spheres of influence, and security architectures. Hollister combines operational insider perspective with uncompromising systemic critique – beyond opinion journalism. His work appears on his bilingual website (German/English) www.michael-hollister.com and in investigative outlets across the German-speaking world and the Anglosphere.
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Sources
- German Bundestag, May 27, 2026 – Printed Paper 21/6164, Federal Government response to Nicole Hess’s written question on funding for media projects: https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/21/061/2106164.pdf
- German Bundestag – Printed Paper 21/7520, Alternative for Germany parliamentary inquiry on project funding for media companies working on digital disinformation: https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/21/075/2107520.pdf
- Federal Ministry of Research, Technology and Space, July 19, 2024 – Funding Guideline “Trust in Democracy and the State: Identifying and Countering Digital Disinformation”: https://www.bmftr.bund.de/SharedDocs/Bekanntmachungen/DE/2024/07/2024-07-19-Bekanntmachung-Desinformation.html
- IT Security and Communications Systems Research Catalogue – noFake project description: https://www.forschung-it-sicherheit-kommunikationssysteme.de/projekte/nofake
- IT Security and Communications Systems Research Catalogue – kuKI project description: https://www.forschung-it-sicherheit-kommunikationssysteme.de/projekte/kuki
- FZI Research Center for Information Technology, April 23, 2026 – kuKI project announcement on an AI assistant against disinformation: https://www.fzi.de/2026/04/23/kuki-gegen-desinformation/
- CORRECTIV – Financial disclosures and public grants: https://correctiv.org/ueber-uns/finanzen/
- German Bundestag Press Service – Federal Government response 20/12475 on press independence: https://www.bundestag.de/presse/hib/kurzmeldungen-1015200
- European Court of Justice, July 02, 2026 – Case C-67/25 concerning the RT distribution ban and the Ickeroth case, summarized by beck-aktuell: https://www.beck-aktuell.de/heute-im-recht/rechtsprechung/eugh-c6725-russia-today-verbot-gilt-auch-unentgeltliche-blogs-2026-07-02
- Berlin Regional Court II, March 17, 2026 – Press release on Case 27 O 379/25: https://www.berlin.de/gerichte/presse/pressemitteilungen-der-ordentlichen-gerichtsbarkeit/2026/pressemitteilung.1653487.php
- Legal Tribune Online – Analysis of Berlin Regional Court II’s reasoning in the CORRECTIV case: https://www.lto.de/recht/hintergruende/h/so-begruendet-das-lg-berlin-ii-die-correctiv-niederlage
- CORRECTIV.Faktencheck, February 16, 2026 – Analysis of RT Deutschland’s continuing reach despite EU sanctions: https://correctiv.org/faktencheck/hintergrund/2026/02/16/eu-sanktionen-inhalte-von-rt-de-erreichen-immer-noch-millionen-aufrufe/
- CORRECTIV, November 24, 2025 – Statement on Russia’s October 10, 2025, designation of CORRECTIV as an “undesirable organization”: https://correctiv.org/in-eigener-sache/2025/11/24/russland-erklaert-correctiv-zur-unerwuenschten-organisation/
- ZDFheute – Report on Russia’s designation of Deutsche Welle as an “undesirable organization”: https://www.zdfheute.de/politik/ausland/deutsche-welle-russland-unerwuenschte-organisation-100.html
- RT Deutschland – Response to the CORRECTIV analysis of its reach: https://de.rt.com/inland/270434-millionen-aufrufe-correctiv-muss-erfolg/
- Cicero, May 2026 – Report on continued public funding for CORRECTIV following the Berlin ruling; access via the homepage using the search terms “Correctiv Steuergeld Desinformation”: https://www.cicero.de/
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