by Michael Hollister
Exclusive published at Michael Hollister on September 06, 2026
5.011 words * about 27 minutes readingtime
Briefing Format of the In-Depth Analysis – 10 minutes readingtime:
The Agreement That Brussels’s Own Lawyers Tried to Stop
On November 29, 2022, the Legal Service of the Council of the European Union issued an opinion classified as “EU Restricted” that contained an unequivocal finding: The agreement the European Commission had negotiated with Israel violated EU and international law, and the decisive clause had to be deleted in its entirety. What happened next is the real story. The Commission continued negotiating.
The matter concerns an agreement between the EU law-enforcement agency Europol and the Israeli security authorities on the exchange of personal data. The Legal Service’s finding has two dimensions. The first is procedural: In its assessment, the Commission had exceeded its negotiating mandate and circumvented the Council. The second is substantive: The draft agreement contains an exception that would have allowed European data to be used in the territories that came under Israeli administration after 1967 – territories the International Court of Justice and the Legal Service itself classify as occupied. One recipient of this data would have been Israel’s domestic intelligence service, Shin Bet. The data to be transferred included the most sensitive categories recognized under European law.
While Brussels continued negotiating against the advice of its own Legal Service, Berlin deepened the same cooperation on its own initiative: On January 12, 2026, Federal Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt signed a “Cyber and Security Pact” with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Jerusalem. The two processes are separate, but they are moving in the same direction. This article follows the European process first.
The question is not whether the EU may share data with Israel – Europol has data-sharing agreements with a number of third countries. The question is what it means when the institution that prescribes compliance to others disregards the explicit legal advice of its own lawyers, sidelines Parliament, and continues pursuing an agreement its own legal experts have declared unlawful. The sequence can be reconstructed from leaked documents published by the civil liberties organization Statewatch and EUobserver on July 30, 2026, as well as from the draft agreement itself. Wherever possible, the account that follows relies on the primary documents – the Legal Service’s opinion, the agreement’s text, and the German government’s answers – rather than on retellings of them.
A Mandate the Commission Exceeded
The relationship between Europol and Israel goes back many years. In 2005, the Council designated Israel a priority partner of the agency. For years, no agreement was reached – in part because the headquarters of the Israel National Police is located in East Jerusalem, in territory internationally recognized as occupied. Instead, the two sides signed a working arrangement in 2018, Europol’s first arrangement with a non-EU country. It permitted the exchange of strategic information – expressly not personal data. The latter requires a legally binding international agreement; the Council granted the mandate for it in June 2018.
Four years later, on September 14, 2022, the Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs announced on X that negotiations had concluded and ratification was the next step. The agreement was never signed. The member states halted the process, which would have required the approval of the Council and the European Parliament, and submitted the text to the Council Legal Service for review. Its opinion was unequivocal: The Commission had included provisions that violated EU and international law and had failed to keep the Council properly informed during the negotiations.
Procedurally, the Legal Service based its conclusion on a specific allegation. The Commission had disregarded “Article 3 of the Council Decision,” the provision of the 2018 Council decision that authorized it to begin negotiations. During the four years of negotiations from 2018 to 2022, it had never consulted the responsible Council working party and had failed to inform it of the planned derogation – a violation of the treaty rules governing the negotiation of international agreements and of the duty of sincere cooperation among the institutions. In response to a question from Statewatch, the Council said the 2018 negotiating mandate was “not modified and still applies” – it remains in force unchanged. The Council therefore did not follow the recommendations of its own Legal Service.
A second Council document suggests that this circumvention of the Council working party was not an oversight by individual officials. In an “I/A” item note dated June 14, 2022, the Council’s General Secretariat reprimanded the Commission for failing to consult the special committee appointed by the Council for more than two years during negotiations on the Europol agreement with New Zealand – from May 13, 2020, to May 13, 2022 – even though Article 218(4) TFEU and the Council decision required it. The initialed text had been submitted to the responsible Council bodies only after negotiations had concluded. The consequence, stated verbatim in the document: The Commission was instructed to consult regularly in the future, in keeping with the principle of sincere cooperation, and particularly on “matters of territorial applicability.” Three months after this admonition, the Commission initialed a text with Israel that inserted an exception in precisely this area – without consulting the Council working party. In November 2022, the Legal Service found the same violation. The documents do not say whether the Commission applied the warning from the New Zealand process to Israel; the sequence speaks for itself.
The Clause for the Territory After June 05, 1967
The substantive core of the dispute lies in two articles of the draft agreement. Article 32 sets out the EU’s position: “in accordance with European Union policy,” the agreement does not apply to the territories that came under Israeli administration after June 05, 1967 – the West Bank, East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, and the Gaza Strip. Yet the same paragraph contains a proviso: This does not affect the possibility of using data under Article 7. The exclusion clause and the loophole stand side by side in the same document.
Article 7 opens the back door. Paragraph 1 requires Israel to use received data only within the agreement’s territorial scope. Paragraph 2 then permits, “by way of derogation” and “exceptionally,” the use of such data in the territories administered after June 05, 1967, supposedly “solely for the protection of the civilian population,” in two cases: when there is an imminent threat to life and the data is needed to prevent a criminal offense, or with Europol’s prior authorization to prevent, investigate, detect, or prosecute criminal offenses. The catch lies in the first case: Under paragraph 3, when there is an imminent threat to life, notification of Europol after the fact is sufficient. Anyone invoking this provision therefore uses the data in occupied territory before Europol has even been asked, explaining only afterward why prior authorization was impossible.
The Legal Service demanded that this exception be deleted in its entirety. Its argument, quoted by Statewatch and EUobserver: It would be the first time an international agreement between the Union and Israel provided for its application to the territories occupied in 1967. This would conflict with the Palestinians’ right to self-determination under international law, as established in UN resolutions and the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, and with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, under which treaties must not harm third parties – in this case, the negotiating position of the Palestinian Authority. EU law would also be applied in territories subject to other jurisdictions: that of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and, in the Golan annexed in 1981, that of Syria. The Legal Service also questioned whether the powers granted to Europol would be compatible with the discretion permitted under the treaties.
The Legal Service rejected the Commission’s justification that Israel, as the occupying power, had a duty to maintain public order and security. This duty did not permit other states or organizations to assist Israel in violation of other principles of international law. Israeli lawyer Eitan Diamond of the Diakonia International Humanitarian Law Centre told Statewatch that this finding was reinforced by the International Court of Justice’s July 2024 advisory opinion: All states and organizations must refrain from acts that contribute to maintaining the Israeli presence deemed unlawful. Ben Saul, the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights while countering terrorism, sees this as a breach of states’ obligation not to recognize situations created through violations of peremptory international law.
The 2018 Warning
The Legal Service was not the first body to issue a warning. On December 20, 2017, the Commission recommended that the Council open negotiations with eight countries in the Middle East and North Africa – Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey. On March 12, 2018, the European Data Protection Supervisor issued Opinion 2/2018. None of the eight countries, including Israel, was covered by an adequacy decision or a Convention 108 process. The derogations under the Europol Regulation were to be used only on a case-by-case basis – not for systematic, large-scale, or structural transfers. The European Data Protection Supervisor called for full compliance with Article 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, particularly purpose limitation, rights of access and rectification, and oversight by an independent authority. The legal basis for the planned transfers would be Article 25 of the Europol Regulation, whose derogations the Supervisor expressly wanted interpreted narrowly: as an instrument for individual cases, not a permanent channel. The decisive fault line had therefore been identified four years before the Legal Service’s opinion – the absence of independent oversight on the recipient’s side and the danger that a narrowly limited exception would become a structural transfer. No visible change of course followed; as far as can be determined, the recommendations had no effect on the negotiating text.
The second warning came from the member states themselves. According to German press reports cited by the Max Planck Institute’s eucrim service, 13 of the 27 member states in the responsible Council working party refused to continue supporting the agreement in November 2022. Their chief concern was that it would have permitted the use of personal data in the territories occupied after 1967; several delegations warned of “a dangerous precedent with considerable political repercussions” and of the risk that Israel could use European data to expand its control over the occupied territories.
And What Happened Next
This produced a chain of three bodies and four points in time: the Data Protection Supervisor’s warning in 2018, the blockade by 13 member states in November 2022, and the Legal Service’s opinion on November 29, 2022. The process was frozen in December 2022 – partly because of resistance from the member states, partly in view of Netanyahu’s new coalition, which took office that same month. This was not a formal termination; the process was suspended, not ended. The Council never changed the 2018 mandate, and no revised Commission draft became visible.
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And yet it continued. A response to a document request shows that Commission officials held at least seven meetings with Israeli diplomats concerning the agreement between 2023 and January 28, 2026, including one with then-Foreign Minister Eli Cohen in April 2023. Only a list of document titles was released; the contents remain unknown. A pattern nonetheless becomes visible: Publicly, the Commission says it does not comment on ongoing negotiations; internally, the titles document a continuity of contacts over more than three years, spanning several Israeli governments and continuing despite the objection of the Council’s Legal Service. The transparency request that produced the list revealed just enough to establish that the meetings took place – and just little enough to leave their substance in the dark. Asked whether it had produced a revised draft following the objections, the Commission replied that it did not comment on the substance of confidential negotiations. Europol, meanwhile, received Israeli delegations at least four times between August 2024 and March 2026, including representatives of the national police, through the Israeli liaison officer at the agency; in March 2026, the Israeli ambassador visited the headquarters in The Hague. Europol’s Fundamental Rights Officer – a position created in 2022 – has, by his own account, never reviewed the cooperation with Israel for compliance with fundamental rights.
At the end of July 2026, 27 members of the European Parliament asked the Commission in written question E-002925/2026 to disclose the purpose of the meetings, the status of the negotiations, and the agreement’s human-rights risks. Formally, the Commission has six weeks to respond; the summer recess may cause a longer delay. The signatories come from several political groups; one of them, French MEP Mounir Satouri, spoke of a double scandal – the substance of the agreement and the way it had been pursued around Parliament. At the time of writing, it remained unclear whether the Commission would provide a substantive answer or again invoke the confidentiality of ongoing negotiations.
What Data, and to Whom
The draft itself identifies what would be transferred. Article 5 also permits special categories, subject to a case-by-case assessment that they are “strictly necessary and proportionate”: data concerning ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, genetic and biometric data, health data, and data concerning a person’s sex life. These are the categories European law protects most strictly.
Annex II lists the authorities to which Europol could transfer data. Alongside the Israel National Police, it expressly names the “Israel Security Agency” – the domestic intelligence service Shin Bet – as well as tax, competition, and anti-money-laundering authorities. The intelligence service is not included by implication; it is explicitly designated as a recipient. Internal onward transfer is loosely regulated: Under Article 8, Europol’s prior authorization is not required for transmission to another Israeli authority when that body is itself a “Competent Authority” under Annex II. Because Shin Bet is included, material can continue circulating within this group. Annex I outlines the purposes for which cooperation is intended. Alongside terrorism and organized crime, the catalog of offenses includes “racism and xenophobia” as well as “genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.” Under Article 3, the transferred data may be used only to prevent, investigate, detect, and prosecute criminal offenses; this is the catalog of offenses for which European data would flow to a circle of recipients that includes the domestic intelligence service.
Article 17 requires a supervisory authority that acts “with complete independence,” free from instructions and protected by secure tenure. The reality is different: Israel’s Privacy Protection Authority is situated within the Ministry of Justice, its head is appointed by the government, and its oversight of intelligence services such as Shin Bet is questionable. The European Data Protection Supervisor stresses that independent oversight is “not merely good practice,” but the central guarantee that data will be handled according to EU standards. Legal scholar Douwe Korff warns that Israeli security authorities could intercept and track data without oversight that satisfies EU rules.
The Input Side of a Machine
The question of why a domestic intelligence service needs European personal data leads to the question of what ultimately happens to it. This analysis has already described the output side – Israel’s data-driven targeting systems – in “Israel: Killing as a Product”. The sea of data described there would have been supplemented by European citizens’ data under the Europol agreement: the same sensitive categories, sent directly to a specifically named recipient, with an exception for the occupied territory.
Precision is essential here, and the experts phrase their warnings carefully. Diamond warns that transmitted information could serve “as intelligence in support of decisions to target and kill Palestinians.” Korff points to highly sensitive data about people in the EU and their contacts – including aid workers, officials, and journalists – going to a service without EU-compliant oversight. Ben Saul also raises concerns about the use of artificial intelligence in data collection, analysis, and military target selection. None of these statements claims that European citizens are on a target list; the warning concerns the data, the named recipient, and its documented procedures. If the output side is a machine that turns data into targets, then the question raised by the Europol agreement concerns the input side: Whose data fills it? The documents do not establish that a single European data record has entered an Israeli targeting system; the experts warn of a possibility, not an established fact. What the agreement establishes is only that the data categories and the recipient would fit – the rest remains the open question the reader carries forward.
The Same Commission, Two Roles
While the Commission continued negotiating the Europol agreement, it was simultaneously defending Israel’s data-adequacy status. The 2011 adequacy decision, reviewed and confirmed in January 2024, permits the free flow of data between the EU and Israel. In April 2024, a coalition of 17 civil liberties organizations led by European Digital Rights (EDRi) called on the Commission to reassess the decision; no answer followed, and a second open letter was sent in June 2025. It is the same divergence between declared standards and conduct that appears elsewhere in EU-Israel relations – for example, in Horizon Europe, where commitments to human-rights conditions and the actual allocation of funds have failed to align for years.
In January 2025, members of the European Parliament asked whether Israel’s continued use of personal data “in ways contrary to GDPR” – including mass surveillance and the targeting of individuals in Gaza – required a reassessment. Commissioner Michael McGrath replied that the Commission did not consider an amendment or repeal necessary and said it had also negotiated a significant strengthening of data-protection safeguards.
The Commission’s defense has a valid core: The adequacy decision under the General Data Protection Regulation concerns transfers from commercial entities to commercial entities – a different legal instrument from the police-related Europol agreement. Yet the argument breaks precisely at the seam. The enhanced safeguards cited by McGrath, incorporated into Israeli law, expressly exclude, according to their own wording, data transferred by an EEA authority responsible for national security or law enforcement to an Israeli security authority. The “enhanced safeguards” therefore do not cover the very category at issue in the Europol agreement. EDRi adviser Itxaso Domínguez also points out that the 2011 adequacy decision applies only to the State of Israel within its recognized borders; an exception that makes Europol data usable in the territories occupied after 1967 would undermine a core condition of that decision. In the background is the European Commission’s continued refusal to reassess Israel’s data-adequacy status and the finding of the UN Special Committee in November 2024 that Israel’s methods of warfare were “consistent with the characteristics of genocide” – an assessment by the United Nations; the proceedings before the International Court of Justice remain pending, and no judgment has been issued.
Berlin’s Declaration That Is Not a Treaty
What Brussels is attempting to organize at the European level, Berlin is advancing bilaterally. On January 12, 2026, Dobrindt signed the “Cyber and Security Pact” with Netanyahu in Jerusalem. Israel was Germany’s most important security partner outside NATO and the EU, the Federal Interior Ministry said; Dobrindt called the country a “role model” and a “premium partner.” At the arrangement’s core is the development of a German “Cyber Dome,” a partially automated system for detecting, analyzing, and responding to cyberattacks for which Germany is to benefit from Israeli expertise. On August 27, 2025, the federal cabinet instructed the ministry to develop an implementation plan across three clusters. The project also includes a joint cyber-research center and the deployment of a Federal Police team to the U.S.-led Office of the Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority (OSC) in Jerusalem, which has trained Palestinian security forces and supported coordination between them and the Israeli military since 2005. Olaf Lindner, the former head of Germany’s police special forces, is to assume the German leadership role there. In February 2026, the two sides conducted their first joint cyberdefense exercise under the name BLUE HORIZON. The German government places Germany’s participation in the OSC within the UN Security Council-approved framework for training future Palestinian police and security forces and stresses that it supports the Palestinian Authority on the path toward a negotiated two-state solution. According to the ministry, the pact itself covers the protection of critical infrastructure, civil protection, and counter-drone defense.
There is a gap between the public label and the legal substance. In response to a minor interpellation by The Left parliamentary group, the German government clarified that, “contrary to the heading … this is not a legally binding agreement under international law, but a political declaration of intent” – formally, a “Joint Declaration.” Because it is not an international treaty, there is no obligation to publish it in the Federal Law Gazette. Publicly staged as a pact, legally nonbinding, its wording not public. It is the bilateral counterpart of what is happening at the EU level: Where Brussels pursues the agreement around Parliament, Berlin has chosen an instrument that does not require the Bundestag’s involvement in the first place and whose text neither lawmakers nor the public have seen. The government names the Federal Office for Information Security, the Central Office for Information Technology in the Security Sector, the Federal Criminal Police Office, and the Federal Police as Germany’s partners; on the Israeli side, chiefly the Israel National Cyber Directorate and the Israel National Police – the same national police force Annex II of the Europol draft names as a recipient.
The Question the Bundestag Never Had Answered
In a further interpellation, The Left parliamentary group asked how far intelligence cooperation extended. Does the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution operate joint databases with Israeli intelligence services under Sections 22c and 22d of the Federal Act on the Protection of the Constitution? The German government refused to answer at all – “for reasons of state security” and on the basis of the Third-Party Rule. It will not even confirm whether such databases exist and refuses to provide the information in classified form to the Bundestag’s Classified Information Office. Also left unanswered was the question of whether the Israeli AI system Lavender is used in Iron Dome or a facility comparable to the Cyber Dome and whether anything similar is planned for the German system. The citizen becomes more legible to the state, while the state will not even tell Parliament whether it operates shared databases with a foreign intelligence service.
In fairness, a bilateral data channel has long existed. Article 22 of the Europol draft expressly leaves existing bilateral mutual legal-assistance treaties between Israel and individual member states unaffected. The German government itself has described how this channel operates: Concerning Hamas activities, there is “case-specific international police information exchange with Israel”; personal data is transferred under Sections 27 et seq. of the Federal Criminal Police Office Act and Section 477 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Police mutual legal assistance is governed by a supplementary agreement to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, concluded on July 20, 1977, and in force since March 06, 1981. What the Europol agreement would organize at the European level has therefore operated bilaterally for decades – without the approval of the European Parliament and without oversight by the European Data Protection Supervisor. What would be new is the leap to structured mass data and the exception for the occupied territory.
On one point, Berlin expressly draws the line that the Commission draft renders permeable: Cooperation with Israel does not extend to territories that became part of the area under Israeli administration after June 05, 1967. Accuracy also requires acknowledging that not every detail is sinister: According to the Federal Criminal Police Office, it is not pursuing projects with Israeli partners on facial recognition or virtual-reality crime-scene analysis; exchange in those areas takes place through an Interpol working group. Israeli companies may, in any event, participate in regular federal tenders.
The Case for the Defense
The draft contains genuine safeguards that the Commission cites in its defense. Article 4(5) prohibits the use of data obtained through a manifest violation of human rights and bars its use in connection with the death penalty or cruel treatment. Article 5 makes special categories subject to strict necessity. Article 6 prohibits solely automated decisions, including profiling, that have adverse legal effects unless authorized by law and accompanied by a right to human intervention. Article 14 requires deletion after no more than three years, while Article 20 provides for suspension in the event of a breach. The Commission expressly points to safeguards such as the restriction concerning the death penalty. Europol data agreements with third countries are also not unusual; one was concluded with New Zealand, for example. The Commission can further argue that a legally regulated framework with enforceable limits is preferable to an unregulated situation: Unlike the mere working arrangement of 2018, the agreement would create binding constraints for an exchange that already takes place bilaterally. Defenders of the draft can argue with some justification that regulation is better than no regulation.
But none of these clauses cures the Legal Service’s two findings. They do not alter the fact that the mandate was exceeded, and they do not change the exception for the occupied territory, which the Legal Service demanded be deleted in its entirety. The 2018 working arrangement expressly did not permit personal data – that is precisely what is new. The safeguards also presuppose what the Legal Service and the data-protection authorities question: functioning, independent oversight on the recipient’s side. Without it, the clauses are merely paper. Nor does the reference to New Zealand support the Commission’s case: There, the Data Protection Supervisor reviewed the final text and found that it provided adequate safeguards; only then did the Council bodies approve it. In the Israeli draft, the EU’s own Legal Service reached the opposite conclusion and demanded deletion of a clause absent from the New Zealand agreement – the exception for an occupied territory. The comparison with other third-country agreements therefore demonstrates not the draft’s normality, but its deviation.
Who Decides What the Rules Are
Externally, the EU measures compliance: It imposes sanctions, issues warnings, and publishes reports on the rule of law in other countries. Internally, an unelected executive decided to disregard the explicit legal advice of its own Council, not consult the responsible working party, and continue negotiating around Parliament – over an agreement the Council’s lawyers had declared incompatible with EU and international law. The 2018 mandate remains in force unchanged. The agreement is not dead. The question submitted by the 27 members of Parliament remains unanswered, and the deadline falls during the summer recess. Nearly four years ago, the Legal Service explained why the text would be incompatible with EU law. Negotiations continued nonetheless. For the people whose data the agreement would have moved, the matter has therefore not been resolved, but postponed. A frozen process is not a terminated one. As long as the mandate stands and the talks continue, the draft remains a text that can return to the table at any time – with or without the clause the Legal Service wanted deleted. The value of the rules an institution demands of others is determined by whether those rules also apply to the institution itself.
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About the Author
Michael Hollister
is a geopolitical analyst and investigative journalist. He served six years in the German military, including peacekeeping deployments in the Balkans (SFOR, KFOR), followed by 14 years in IT security management. His analysis draws on primary sources to examine European militarization, Western intervention policy, and shifting power dynamics across Asia. A particular focus of his work lies in Southeast Asia, where he investigates strategic dependencies, spheres of influence, and security architectures. Hollister combines operational insider perspective with uncompromising systemic critique – beyond opinion journalism. His work appears on his bilingual website (German/English) www.michael-hollister.com and in investigative outlets across the German-speaking world and the Anglosphere.
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Sources
- Draft Europol-Israel Agreement, WK 12569/2022 INIT, September 26, 2022 – Full text with Articles 5, 7, 8, 17, and 32 and annexes
- Statewatch, Giacomo Zandonini, July 30, 2026 – Exclusive: EU Commission still seeking controversial police agreement with Israel, despite warnings
- EUobserver, Giacomo Zandonini, July 30, 2026 – Exclusive: Leaked legal advice questions legality of EU Commission’s Israeli police data-deal
- Council Legal Service, November 29, 2022 – EU RESTRICTED opinion, document page at Statewatch
- Council of the European Union, June 14, 2022 – I/A item note ST-10178-2022-INIT concerning the New Zealand agreement and the failure to consult
- Council of the European Union – 2018 negotiating mandate, ST-9331-2018-ADD-1
- eucrim (Max Planck Institute), Thomas Wahl, December 01, 2022 – EU Member States Froze Closer Ties between Europol and Israel
- eucrim – EDPS Opinion on International Agreements with Eight Third Countries
- European Parliament – Report A8-0235/2018, referring to EDPS Opinion 2/2018 and Convention 108
- Computer Weekly, Sebastian Klovig Skelton, July 29, 2025 – European Commission ignores calls to reassess Israel data adequacy
- European Parliament – Written question from 27 members to the Commission, E-002925/2026
- German Bundestag, February 11, 2026 – Minor interpellation by The Left parliamentary group, Bundestag document 21/4092
- German Bundestag, February 23, 2026 – German government’s response, Bundestag document 21/4306: Joint Declaration; refusal to answer on Sections 22c and 22d BVerfSchG and Lavender
- German Bundestag, December 18, 2025 – German government’s response, Bundestag document 21/3368: Sections 27 et seq. BKAG and 477 StPO; 1977 supplementary mutual legal-assistance agreement; June 05, 1967 line
- German Federal Ministry of the Interior, January 12, 2026 – Cooperation with Israel on cybersecurity is being expanded
- German Federal Ministry of the Interior, February 2026 – Joint BLUE HORIZON cyberdefense exercise
- Table.Briefings, January 11, 2026 – Cybersecurity: Dobrindt signs security pact and expands cooperation with Israel
- Douwe Korff – Opinion on EU-Israel data transfers
- Michael Hollister, June 14, 2026 – Israel: Killing as a Product
- Michael Hollister, November 30, 2025 – Horizon Europe
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