by Michael Hollister
Exclusively published by HAINTZ.media on September 15, 2026.
2.782 words * 15 minutes readingtime
Update to the main analysis – continue reading here:
The Indispensable Third Party
At 4:30 p.m. on September 10, 2026, Yūji Iwasawa, president of the International Court of Justice, closed the hearing at the Peace Palace in The Hague. Four days of oral argument lay behind the parties. There was no judgment – and none had been expected. The question before the Court was not whether the Federal Republic of Germany had aided and abetted genocide through its arms deliveries to Israel. The question was whether the Court had jurisdiction to decide that issue at all.
That is the central point of this week. A founding member of the European Union, which for decades has presented itself as a champion of a rules-based order, spent four days responding to the gravest allegation known to international law with questions of jurisdiction. I wrote about an earlier stage of these proceedings elsewhere; this article concerns the oral hearings themselves and what they reveal. The central question is not whether the proceedings will ultimately result in a finding against Germany – that is for the judges to decide, and the road to such a ruling is long. The more precise question is this: What does the way Berlin defends itself reveal about the relationship of Western states to the very law they so insistently invoke against others?
What Was Argued – and What Was Not
The case began on March 01, 2024. Nicaragua instituted proceedings, alleging that Germany had violated its obligations under the 1948 Genocide Convention and the Geneva Conventions through arms exports to Israel and the temporary suspension of payments to the UN relief agency UNRWA. In its 2025 memorial, Managua additionally developed an allegation of racial discrimination, segregation, and apartheid, relying on the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, or CERD. Nicaragua bases the Court’s jurisdiction on the declarations by which both states accepted its compulsory jurisdiction, the compromissory clause of the Genocide Convention, and – in addition – Article 22 of CERD.
At the same time, Managua requested provisional measures in 2024 – an immediate halt to deliveries. On April 30, 2024, the Court rejected that request by 15 votes to one. Yet it expressly declined to dismiss the case itself: There was no manifest lack of jurisdiction. And it reminded all states, including Germany, of their obligations when supplying arms to parties to a conflict. After Nicaragua filed its fully developed memorial in July 2025, Berlin chose not to submit a counter-memorial, but took the alternative route: On October 21, 2025, the last day permitted under the Court’s rules, it raised preliminary objections to jurisdiction and admissibility. This automatically suspended the proceedings on the merits.
It was precisely these incidental proceedings that were argued from September 07 to 10, with two rounds for each party. No ruling is delivered during such hearings. The Court’s decision on the objections – which will take the form of a judgment – is not expected until early 2027, according to observers. And only if the Court rejects the objections will the merits be heard at all. A final judgment on the substance would then still be years away.
Germany’s Four Objections
Berlin’s defense attacks the application from four directions, all of them procedural.
First: Germany argues that no legal dispute existed between the parties when the application was filed. In the second round, Germany’s counsel Antonios Tsanakopoulos presented a chronology. Just over two weeks separated Nicaragua’s first note verbale from the institution of proceedings, and one month – the shortest month of the year – separated the very first public announcement from the filing. In comparable cases, the Court had examined years of diplomatic exchanges; in the dispute between Georgia and Russia, more than eight. Here, there had not been a single substantive exchange, merely the transmission of a note and confirmation of its receipt. One detail is particularly striking: Nicaragua had simultaneously considered proceedings against four states, sent similar notes to all four, and decided on Germany only a few days before filing the application.
Second: the temporal limitation. Germany’s declaration accepting the Court’s jurisdiction dates from April 30, 2008, and applies only to disputes arising after that date. A substantial part of Nicaragua’s claims, Berlin argues, is rooted in a decades-long policy toward Israel: from corporate participation and submarine contracts of the 1990s and 2000s to long-standing military support. On this point, Germany’s position gained visible force. During the hearings, Nicaragua expressly narrowed its claim to export authorizations granted after April 30, 2008 – and sought to abandon the earlier violations still alleged in its memorial. International lawyer Christian Tams, also appearing for Germany, called this an impermissible reconstruction: A dispute pending before the world’s highest court is “not an accordion that can be stretched and compressed at will.” The fact that Nicaragua had to take this step at all suggests that the objection has force.
Third – and legally the core of the case: the Monetary Gold principle, named after a 1954 case. To establish Germany’s complicity, the Court would first have to determine that Israel itself had acted unlawfully under international law. Israel, however, is not a party to the proceedings and has not consented to the Court’s jurisdiction. In the second round, counsel Samuel Wordsworth dissected Nicaragua’s proposed way around the problem: Managua wanted Israel’s responsibility to be treated “as a given,” supported by UN reports and the Court’s advisory opinions. Taken together, Wordsworth argued, the two strands pointed in opposite directions. And if the Court were now to treat Israel’s genocide as established, it would effectively decide the pending South Africa v. Israel case before Israel had ever been heard in it.
Fourth: CERD. Article 22 of the convention requires that a dispute be pursued through negotiations before the Court is seised – a requirement that, in Germany’s reading, Nicaragua failed to satisfy.
These objections must be taken seriously, even if the result is uncomfortable. The Monetary Gold principle is not mere legal trickery; the international-law literature is divided, and the chronology required to establish a dispute is an area in which the Court has previously dismissed applications.
The counterposition is equally serious. International lawyer Adil Haque, for example, argues that Israel’s absence is no obstacle: The duty to prevent under the Genocide Convention attaches to persons, not to Israel’s state responsibility; the Court therefore need not adjudicate Israel’s responsibility in order to adjudicate Germany’s. The Court relied on a similar mechanism in 2007 when it examined Serbia’s responsibility in connection with the Srebrenica genocide – and found Serbia not responsible for complicity. Which interpretation will prevail remains open, and that is precisely the dispute that will be fought over in the coming years.
Nicaragua’s memorial consolidates its claims in the subparagraphs of paragraph 484. Germany’s final submission asks the Court not to entertain any of them.
Nicaragua’s Response
Managua counters that the case concerns Germany’s own obligations – to prevent genocide and not to be complicit in it – not a judgment against Israel. The duty to act under the convention arises as soon as a serious risk is known; a final judgment finding genocide against Israel is not required. In any event, a judgment binds only the parties, Germany and Nicaragua – Israel is not an indispensable third party. Counsel Alain Pellet, an avowed skeptic of the Monetary Gold doctrine, considers it entirely unnecessary because the Court’s jurisdiction rests on state consent in any case.
On the substance, Nicaragua sharpened its argument. It was impossible, it said, for the German government to have overlooked the serious risk. Nicaragua’s representative Carlos Argüello Gómez accused Berlin of failing to distinguish between self-defense and genocide, spoke of crimes visible today “on a live stream,” and drew parallels to the Nazi era. That is rhetoric, not a jurisdictional argument – and it should be read as such. Nicaragua’s final submission asks the Court to reject all objections and find that a dispute exists, that the temporal and treaty requirements have been fulfilled, and that Israel is not indispensable.
What the Authorization Record Shows
Although the formal issue was jurisdiction alone, Germany also defended its export practices. This is where the verifiable core lies.
First, the figures. According to a response by the German government to a parliamentary question from the Left Party, reported by Der Spiegel, Berlin authorized arms exports to Israel worth €799.4 million in the first half of 2026 – almost four times the approximately €201 million approved during the entire previous year. That makes a headline. But it does not support everything frequently loaded onto it. According to the German government, 67 percent of the €735.8 million authorized in the second quarter was attributable to a single major naval project, and 21 percent to German-Israeli industrial cooperation serving the German military. Nearly nine-tenths of the total therefore cannot simply be described as “weapons for Gaza.” There is more: On August 08, 2025, Chancellor Friedrich Merz had suspended authorization of goods that could be used in the Gaza Strip; the suspension was lifted in November 2025 with reference to the ceasefire. Anyone interpreting the €799 million as escalated complicity is arguing against the evidence they themselves cite.
The point that genuinely challenges Germany’s account lies elsewhere. At the opening of the hearings, the human rights organization ECCHR evaluated official authorization figures. According to its analysis, only €106,000 of the total €163.8 million authorized in 2024 was for protective equipment – 0.065 percent – even though Germany had just relied before the Court on the small share of weapons of war and the protective nature of the goods. For 2025, the report documents more than €110 million for parts used in tanks and armored vehicles. Germany’s 2024 defense – a robust control system, declining authorizations, and predominantly protective goods – therefore stands in tension with its own subsequent record. This is a finding, not a judgment: the gap between the standard Germany claimed and the authorizations it actually granted, visible in official figures.
For context, the annual progression is as follows: In 2023, Germany authorized exports to Israel worth €326.5 million; in 2024, €163.8 million; in 2025, approximately €201 million; and in the first half of 2026, the aforementioned €799.4 million, most of it attributable to the naval project. After the United States, Germany ranks among Israel’s most important arms suppliers.
The Logic of Power
Why is Berlin defending itself so tenaciously on jurisdiction rather than on the merits? Proceedings on the merits would force the Court to make findings touching on Israel’s conduct – and would create a precedent on the responsibility of third states for arms deliveries. What is new is the narrow constellation: A third state is being pursued not for the underlying act, but solely for complicity through arms transfers. It is not new for a state to face an allegation of complicity in genocide before the Court – in 2007, the Court examined Serbia’s responsibility in connection with Srebrenica. Germany is not the only supplier, either. A judgment on third-state complicity through arms exports would affect an entire category of Western exporters. Clearing the jurisdictional hurdle now would avoid precisely that precedent – and at the same time prevent the authorization record from ever being examined on the merits before the Court.
The applicant is also following a sober logic. Nicaragua did not choose Germany by accident: Berlin has accepted the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction; the United States – Israel’s largest arms supplier – has not. Any attempt to sue Washington would fail for lack of consent; Germany was, in purely legal terms, the reachable target. There is also Nicaragua’s own precedent: In 1986, the same Court ruled against the United States in Nicaragua v. United States over Washington’s support for the Contra rebels. Managua knows both sides from its own experience – that a small state can prevail against a great power before the world’s highest court, and that a judgment without an enforcer may have no practical effect. An honest assessment must also include the other side: According to a UN-backed expert body, the Ortega government itself commits serious human rights violations. That does not legally diminish the application – before a court, the submissions matter, not the character of the applicant – but it explains why Berlin and sympathetic voices were able to dismiss the proceedings as biased without addressing their substance.
Germany frames the issue differently, and its argument is not empty. According to Germany’s representative, Julia Monar, this is the first case in the Court’s history in which neither the applicant nor the respondent is a party to the underlying conflict; in precisely such a case, the principle of consent on which the Court’s jurisdiction rests is indispensable. The interests are open; there is no need to impute them in order to identify them. What remains is the tension: A state that declares international law to be the foundation of its foreign policy invokes a procedural right to avoid review on the merits as soon as that law is directed against itself.
Three Scenarios
How the case ends remains open; three paths are conceivable. If the objections prevail, the case dies at the threshold without the merits ever being heard – a signal to all Western supplier states and a setback for the wave of litigation initiated by South Africa. If they fail, the actual proceedings begin: As far as can be determined, it would be the first time a Western state had to defend itself before the world’s highest court on the merits against an allegation of complicity in genocide. Third, politics could overtake the law – the fragile ceasefire in place since November 2025 has already been invoked to justify the resumption of German deliveries, and a lasting change in Gaza would reduce the dispute’s urgency without formally ending it.
Conclusion
Nothing has been decided. But the four days revealed something. Germany had two possible answers to the gravest allegation known to international law: the merits or jurisdiction. It chose jurisdiction – and the last permissible day. That is legitimate, and it is tactically astute. Whether the Court ultimately has jurisdiction will occupy international lawyers for years. The method is already on the record.
Exclusively published by HAINTZ.media on September 15, 2026.
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About the Author
Michael Hollister
is a geopolitical analyst and investigative journalist. He served six years in the German military, including peacekeeping deployments in the Balkans (SFOR, KFOR), followed by 14 years in IT security management. His analysis draws on primary sources to examine European militarization, Western intervention policy, and shifting power dynamics across Asia. A particular focus of his work lies in Southeast Asia, where he investigates strategic dependencies, spheres of influence, and security architectures. Hollister combines operational insider perspective with uncompromising systemic critique – beyond opinion journalism. His work appears on his bilingual website (German/English) www.michael-hollister.com and in investigative outlets across the German-speaking world and the Anglosphere.
Sources
- International Court of Justice – case page, Alleged Breaches of Certain International Obligations in respect of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Nicaragua v. Germany): https://www.icj-cij.org/case/193
- ICJ, Press Release 2026/23 – Conclusion of the Hearings (September 10, 2026, PDF): https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/193/193-20260910-pre-01-00-en.pdf
- ICJ, Verbatim Record CR 2026/32 – Germany’s Second Round (September 09, 2026, PDF): https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/193/193-20260909-ora-01-00-bi.pdf
- ICJ, Order on Provisional Measures of April 30, 2024 (PDF): https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/193/193-20240430-ord-01-00-en.pdf
- Communiqué by the Government of Nicaragua on the Conclusion of the Hearings (September 10, 2026): https://orinocotribune.com/statement-by-the-government-of-nicaragua-on-icj-hearings-vs-germany-palestine-genocide
- ECCHR, “Arming International Crimes – Germany’s Continuing Arms Exports to Israel, 2023-2026” (press release, September 07, 2026): https://www.ecchr.eu/pressemitteilung/trotz-internationaler-warnungen-deutschland-lieferte-2023-2026-kontinuierlich-ruestungsexporte-nach-israel-in-milliardenhoehe/
- ECCHR, Report (PDF): https://www.ecchr.eu/fileadmin/Publikationen/ECCHR_Report_Arming_International_Crimes_EN.pdf
- Middle East Eye, “Germany asks ICJ to dismiss Gaza genocide case brought by Nicaragua”: https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/germany-asks-icj-dismiss-nicaragua-genocide-case-over-arms-supplies-israel
- TRT Deutsch, report on the hearings (German government/Der Spiegel figures, August 2025 suspension): https://www.trtdeutsch.com/article/5cfc1d028e18
- Legal Tribune Online, report on the second day of hearings (Nicaragua’s first round, Pellet on Monetary Gold): https://www.lto.de/recht/hintergruende/h/igh-beihilfe-voelkermord-israel-palaestina-zweiter-tag-anhoerungen-nicaragua-deutschland
- amerika21, “Nicaragua gegen Deutschland: Anhörung in Den Haag” (decision expected in early 2027): https://amerika21.de/2026/09/290222/anhoerung-den-haag
- Just Security / Adil Ahmad Haque, “Nicaragua v. Germany: Why Israel Is Not an Indispensable Third Party” (November 20, 2025): https://www.justsecurity.org/124907/nicaragua-germany-israel-indispensable/
- Verfassungsblog, “Schrödinger’s Breach: Preliminary Objections in Alleged Breaches of Certain International Obligations in respect of the Occupied Palestinian Territory” (CERD as an additional basis for jurisdiction): https://verfassungsblog.de/schrodingers-breach/
- GPIL / Stefan Talmon, “Germany Files Preliminary Objections at the Last Minute” (November 10, 2025): https://gpil.jura.uni-bonn.de/2025/11/nicaragua-v-germany-germany-files-preliminary-objections-at-the-last-minute/
- OHCHR, “Israel Has Committed Genocide in the Gaza Strip, UN Commission Finds” (September 16, 2025): https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/09/israel-has-committed-genocide-gaza-strip-un-commission-finds
- Michael Hollister, “Der unverzichtbare Dritte – wie Deutschland dem Völkermord-Verfahren prozessual ausweicht” (June 10, 2026): https://www.michael-hollister.com/de/2026/06/10/der-unverzichtbare-dritte/
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