What BlackRock Gains from the Chancellor’s Policies – Part 2

The early-start pension, funded retirement provision, the Germany Fund and rearmament are presented as answers to four different problems. Yet all four open billion-euro markets to asset managers - including BlackRock, Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s former client. This deep dive follows the money, lobbying positions and policy decisions, clearly separating documented influence and structural advantages from mere speculation.

by Michael Hollister
Exclusive published at Michael Hollister on August 02, 2026

4.652 words * 25 minutes readingtime

How the early-start pension, the funded pension, the Germany Fund, and rearmament are creating new markets for the chancellor’s former employer. Part 2 of a two-part analysis.

Part 1 read here:
The Operating System of Global Financial Markets – How BlackRock’s Aladdin Became Private Infrastructure

Briefing Format of the In-Depth Analysis – 10 minutes readingtime:
What BlackRock Gains from the Chancellor’s Policies

Independent geopolitical analysis – weekly delivered to your inbox.

The Assignment BlackRock Defined Itself

On June 13, 2025, a 3-page paper arrived at the Federal Chancellery. Sender: BlackRock Asset Management Deutschland AG, Lenbachplatz 1, Munich. Subject: the Frühstart-Rente, Germany’s early-start pension program. According to the company’s own description, the paper advocated digitally accessible retirement products offering a broad choice of investments in order to establish capital-market-based saving behavior from childhood. It was also addressed to the Federal Finance Ministry, the Federal Economics Ministry, and the parliamentary groups in the Bundestag.

The episode is neither secret nor illegal. It appears in the German Bundestag’s Lobby Register under registration number R003422, complete with the date, recipients, and number of pages. That is precisely what the register was created for. It is nevertheless remarkable because of the timing. On June 13, 2025, Friedrich Merz had been chancellor for 5 weeks and 3 days. And from 2016 through March 2020, Merz had chaired the supervisory board of the very BlackRock subsidiary that sent the paper.

Nine months later, on March 6, 2026, another submission from the same company reached the Chancellery: 10 pages on reforming occupational pensions.

That frames the question addressed in this second part. The question is not whether the chancellor takes instructions. It is this: Which decisions by the Merz government create measurable benefits, new markets, or potential mandates for BlackRock – and to what extent does the political transformation pursued by this government coincide with the program BlackRock itself publicly advocates?

Throughout, this article distinguishes between 3 categories. First: documented economic benefits. Second: plausible business opportunities and structural convergence of interests. Third: personal influence, instructions, or agreements. There is no evidence for the third category. This article does not allege it – and where the chain of evidence ends, it says so.

Part 1 of this series described what BlackRock is: an asset manager whose Aladdin risk system has become infrastructure for entire financial markets. Part 2 asks what this actor gains from German policy.

More Than a Supervisor

The wording came from BlackRock itself. When the company hired Merz in 2016, it said he would not merely serve on the supervisory board but would take on a broader advisory role – he would “promote relations with key clients, regulators, and regulatory authorities in Germany.” That is how the lobbying-monitoring platform Lobbypedia documents the role. A supervisory board monitors management. Promoting relations with regulators and regulatory authorities is something else. It is interest representation.

The compensation for this dual role was the subject of speculation for years and was partially clarified in 2024. Dirk Schmitz, then BlackRock’s head of Germany, told the Süddeutsche Zeitung that the base salary for the supervisory-board position had been approximately €150,000 a year; some of the speculation could be “definitely buried”. At the same time, Schmitz acknowledged that this base salary was supplemented by compensation for advisory services – an amount BlackRock did not disclose then and still does not disclose. An advisory contract whose fee remains unknown is not a scandal. It is a gap.

At this point, a correction to the public debate is necessary. Merz’s famous 2018 statement that he did not go home with “less than €1 million” gross did not refer to BlackRock. It referred to his total income – at the time, Merz also held positions at WEPA Industrieholding, HSBC Trinkaus, Cologne Bonn Airport, and Swiss train manufacturer Stadler Rail, and he was senior counsel at the law firm Mayer Brown. Anyone attributing the entire million to BlackRock is making the kind of mistake serious research must avoid.

Schmitz’s own assessment also belongs in the article: Merz had been a good supervisory-board chairman for the local legal entity and a valuable adviser to management, whose work focused on strategic discussions about expanding the business in Germany and on appearances before clients and at events where he presented his views on geopolitical and economic developments. That is the company’s interpretation: an analyst with a respected name, not a door opener.

Merz resigned from the position in March 2020 to run for the CDU leadership. Contact did not end entirely. In January 2025, a few weeks before the federal election, Larry Fink hosted a dinner in Davos outside the World Economic Forum’s official program. Merz, then the candidate for chancellor, promoted his agenda there to U.S. corporate executives; Wirtschaftswoche reported from close range. What this dinner documents must be stated precisely: it documents continued access. It does not document a continuing business relationship.

Reactions followed the expected political lines. SPD parliamentary leader Rolf Mützenich accused Merz of wanting to “appease” Donald Trump. Jan van Aken, chair of The Left, called the appearance “tone-deaf and completely inappropriate.” Both statements were political judgments made during an election campaign, not factual findings.

How BlackRock Makes Money from Policy

The title of this article demands an answer to a question that is rarely asked: Through which channels does money flow to an asset manager when a state restructures its financial architecture? Without that answer, every allegation remains vague.

The crucial distinction is between manager and owner. When BlackRock holds shares in a company through iShares funds, those shares do not belong to BlackRock. They belong to the funds’ investors – pension funds, insurers, and retail savings-plan customers. When the share price rises, the gain accrues to the investors, not the manager. BlackRock earns the management fee: a percentage of assets under management, year after year, regardless of whether the price rises or falls. When the price rises, assets under management increase – and so does the fee. The connection is real, but indirect.

The German subsidiary’s 2024 financial statements, filed with the Lobby Register, show what this looks like in concrete terms. BlackRock Asset Management Deutschland AG managed €40.1 billion as of the reporting date, plus €9.2 billion across the 21 subfunds of iShares (DE) I Investmentaktiengesellschaft. According to the company, its largest source of commission income is the management fee generated by German iShares ETFs. Net commission income rose to €108.1 million from €98.9 million the previous year. For 2025, the company forecast pre-tax earnings of €41.3 million, with assets under management growing by 7.6 percent. The profit is transferred to the parent. Share capital amounts to €5 million.

There are additional revenue channels that differ in their political sensitivity: institutional management mandates in which a public or semi-public fund outsources the management of its capital; infrastructure and private-equity funds that generate performance fees in addition to management fees; private credit; advisory mandates; and the technology and risk-management platform examined in Part 1 of this series.

The group itself sets out the scale. In his 2026 annual chairman’s letter, Larry Fink reports $14 trillion in assets under management, approximately $700 billion in net inflows during 2025 – the strongest inflow year in the company’s history – and 9 percent organic growth in base fees, equal to $1.5 billion in new base fees. Fink sets a target of more than $35 billion in revenue by 2030, with at least 30 percent expected to come from private markets and technology.

That is the scale. Anyone asking what BlackRock gains from German policy must ask which policies increase assets under management, open mandates, or create investment assets in precisely the sectors on which the company is basing its future growth.

The Wish List Is in the Register

The usual suspicion in this debate is that somewhere there is a paper no one is allowed to see. The finding is different – and more uncomfortable for the reader. The paper is public. It has been available on BlackRock’s server since March 7, 2025.

On that date, the company submitted its response on the European Savings and Investments Union to the European Commission’s Directorate-General FISMA. The text is remarkably specific. It says that participation by private households in capital markets should be the highest priority because the EU lags behind other developed markets in this area. The company supports the creation of individual investment accounts. It calls for ease of use, broad investor choice, and stable, comprehensible tax incentives. It recommends encouraging regular saving so that savers can invest small amounts frequently and in diversified form. For longer-term goals, BlackRock writes, automatic enrollment and the design of default products based on lifecycle principles are essential. It also says access to private markets should be broadened through retirement arrangements. The European Long-Term Investment Fund structure, ELTIF, is already a global leader, it argues, but has yet to realize its full potential.

This is not a leak. It is public relations.

The German register entry completes the picture. BlackRock Asset Management Deutschland lists 13 specific legislative and regulatory initiatives in which it represents interests. These include reform of private retirement provision, with a stated focus on digital solutions designed to be inexpensive, flexible, and simple. Reform of occupational pensions. The introduction of partial funding for pensions, with the goal of embedding fiduciary principles in Germany’s Generationenkapital. The national introduction of European investment accounts – where BlackRock explicitly calls for flexible, digitally accessible solutions offering broad product choice and tax integration rather than new product requirements or restrictive holding periods. Reform of the European securitization framework, focused on broadening the investor base to support infrastructure and small and medium-sized businesses. And the introduction of the Frühstart-Rente.

The concentration is striking. Five of the 13 initiatives directly concern retirement provision. The company describes its methods in the register: discussions with representatives of ministries, parliamentary groups, and public authorities; participation in events and technical dialogues; selectively prepared and submitted position papers; contributions to specialist studies, panels, and public consultations. The stated aim is to help shape regulatory frameworks that promote transparency, strengthen investor protection, and enable responsible growth in capital markets.

Registered lobbying expenditure for the 2024 financial year was between €740,001 and €750,000, with 1.1 full-time equivalents. In fairness, that is not an army. It is a very small, highly focused operation, and it costs less than some industry associations spend for less effect. Yet the 10 people named in the register include Philipp Hildebrand, the former chairman of the Swiss National Bank and BlackRock’s current vice chairman. When you send Hildebrand, you are not sending a staffer.

That leaves Larry Fink himself. His 2026 annual chairman’s letter contains a chapter devoted to Germany. Fink describes the federal government’s proposals presented at the end of 2025 to expand tax-advantaged, state-supported private retirement provision and refers to the pension commission established in parallel – with footnotes linking to the Federal Finance Ministry and Federal Labor Ministry. German pension assets, he notes, are low relative to gross domestic product. And because Germany is Europe’s largest economy, even incremental changes in how retirement provision is structured and invested have effects beyond its borders. The letter’s summary puts it more concisely: in Germany, a pension shift could help deepen Europe’s capital markets.

The same document states that more than half of the assets BlackRock manages are connected to retirement.

Starting at Age 6

On December 17, 2025, the federal cabinet approved 2 measures on the same day.

The first was the government’s draft Retirement Provision Reform Act. It replaces the Riester pension. Its centerpiece is a new product category, the retirement-investment account – according to the Federal Finance Ministry, it allows people to save for retirement without guarantees and with higher potential returns. It will also be offered as a particularly simple standard product. Launch date: January 1, 2027.

The second measure established the key points of the Frühstart-Rente. Parents of children who have turned 6 can open an individual, funded, privately administered retirement-investment account with a provider of their choice. The state guarantees a monthly deposit of €10 until adulthood. Third parties may add to it. Returns remain tax-free until retirement. And if parents take no action, the federal government has provided a fallback mechanism: unclaimed funds will be invested by birth cohort and later transferred into individual contracts.

These decisions can be placed alongside BlackRock’s submission of March 7, 2025 and compared point by point.

BlackRock calls for individual investment accounts. The federal government creates the retirement-investment account. BlackRock recommends encouraging the regular investment of small amounts. The federal government deposits €10 a month. BlackRock calls for stable, comprehensible tax incentives. The federal government exempts returns from taxation until retirement. BlackRock considers automatic enrollment and default-product design essential. The federal government creates a fallback mechanism for everyone who does nothing – and a particularly simple standard product for everyone else. And the Business Location Promotion Act, which comes from the same reform package, explicitly makes it easier to open accounts for minors under the heading of reducing bureaucracy.

Fink sharpens the idea further in his letter: a growing number of countries are experimenting with investment accounts funded at birth.

Then there is the second pillar. The Pension Commission recommends that a social-partner dialogue in 2026 develop concrete measures to increase occupational-pension coverage substantially in areas that are currently underserved, followed by legislation. The long-term goal should be close to universal occupational-pension coverage. For the Frühstart-Rente, the Commission explicitly recommends linking it with the statutory funded pension in order to enable particularly long accumulation periods.

This creates something that has never existed in Germany in this form: uninterrupted capital-market participation from the age of 6 until retirement. The state opens the first account. It grants tax advantages to private retirement provision. It is discussing a mandatory occupational component. It is planning a mandatory statutory funded pension. The resulting assets will be administered – and priced – by funds, banks, insurers, and asset managers for decades.

The scale is determined not by the subsidy, but by the duration. Ten euros a month is nothing. Ten euros a month over 12 years, followed by 4 decades of personal contributions and multiplied across every annual cohort, creates a capital stock whose management generates permanent fees. Compound interest works for the saver. The fee works for the manager. Both work for the same length of time.

Nor would BlackRock manage every euro. Savings banks, cooperative banks, insurers, and neobrokers will compete for the same accounts, and Germany’s savings banks have better access to customers. But anyone offering index products at scale in Europe cannot avoid iShares: by its own account, BlackRock is Europe’s largest ETF provider, and according to the German subsidiary’s annual financial statements, management fees from German iShares ETFs are its largest source of revenue.

The counterargument is strong and must remain. The demographic pressure is real: fewer and fewer contributors are financing more and more retirees, and the federal government justifies the reform on precisely those grounds. The Riester pension was regarded for years as too expensive and too weak in returns – criticism that came not from the fund industry, but from consumer advocates. As Fink correctly notes, funded systems in the Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden have accumulated substantial long-term assets. Anyone who rejects funded retirement provision in principle must offer an alternative answer to the demographic arithmetic. The fact that reform benefits the fund industry does not make it wrong.

The question is different: Who selects the products, who manages the capital, who bears the losses – and what fees are charged over 4 decades?

The Funded Pension – Where the Match Breaks Down

This is where it becomes interesting, because this is where the alignment ends.

On June 23, 2026, the Old-Age Security Commission delivered its report at the Federal Chancellery. Chancellor Merz, Labor Minister Bärbel Bas, and the 2 co-chairs, Frank-Jürgen Weise and Constanze Janda, were present. Thirty-three recommendations across approximately 80 pages. Merz called it one of the most difficult reform projects of our time and said the country could not afford to isolate individual measures. On July 2, 2026, the coalition committee agreed to implement all 33 recommendations in full. The legislative process is supposed to be completed by the end of 2026.

The centerpiece is the statutory funded pension: an additional contribution equal to 2 percent of gross pay, shared equally by employees and employers, introduced beginning in 2028 in steps of 0.5 percentage points and invested in individual capital accounts modeled on Sweden. For an employee earning €3,500 gross, that amounts to approximately €35 a month out of pocket once the system is fully implemented.

And now comes the point at which the simple narrative breaks down: the Commission does not recommend a market for fund providers. It recommends a publicly administered, internationally competitive fund and explicitly cites KENFO, the state fund for financing nuclear-waste disposal, as an example. Those who do not want to contribute to that fund, the report says, should be able to choose from the smallest possible number of certified investment funds offered by other providers – all subject to the same strict criteria. Effective annual costs should be capped at 0.1 percent.

Zero-point-one percent. That is not a gift to the fund industry. It is a margin at which active management is simply not viable. The specialist publication Pfefferminzia reaches the obvious conclusion: anyone seeking to participate would have to limit themselves to index funds.

On this central point, Germany’s funded pension therefore diverges from what BlackRock demands in the Lobby Register, where the company calls for broad product choice rather than new product requirements. A public fund with a cost cap and a deliberately small number of certified alternatives is the opposite. Anyone claiming that the Merz government simply worked through BlackRock’s wish list fails at this section.

But a 0.1-percent cost cap is also something else. It is a filter. At that margin, only firms with scale survive – firms operating index products at a volume where one-tenth of a percentage point still covers costs. The cap protects contributors from the fee erosion that caused Riester to fail. At the same time, it narrows the field of possible providers toward the world’s largest index houses. Both statements are true.

That is why the decisive questions have not been answered, but remain open – and will be decided in the coming months. First: Who will manage the public fund? Will it be based at KENFO, which invests its capital through external mandates, or at an institution with its own portfolio management? The answer will determine whether the fund industry receives mandates worth billions. Second: Who will be certified, under what criteria, and in what number? Anyone who considers these questions mere details has not understood the business.

One incidental point is noteworthy: the fund-industry association BVI observes that KENFO itself was forced to invest through Luxembourg funds in foreign infrastructure because of Germany’s disadvantages as a fund domicile. The Business Location Promotion Act removes precisely those disadvantages.

Here too, the counterargument belongs in the article. In June 2026, the Economic and Social Research Institute of the Hans Böckler Foundation published a policy brief that fundamentally criticizes the Commission’s design: lowering the benefit level in the pay-as-you-go component would also reduce the value of disability pensions, mothers’ pensions, and the basic pension; the assumed rates of return are optimistic; and unequal treatment among age cohorts results from the system’s transition. Employers’ associations reject equal co-financing because of its effect on non-wage labor costs. DGB chair Yasmin Fahimi criticizes the abolition of early retirement without deductions as socially unjust. The funded pension is contested – from both sides.

The Germany Fund and the Business Location Promotion Act

The pension reforms create the inflow of capital. The second half of the transformation creates the investment assets and the channels leading to them.

On December 18, 2025, the federal government and KfW launched the Germany Fund. The federal government is providing approximately €30 billion in public funds and guarantees, intended to trigger roughly €130 billion in investment. The overwhelming share – at least €100 billion – is expected to come from the private sector. Target groups include industry, small and medium-sized businesses, start-ups and scale-ups, private and municipal energy utilities, and explicitly companies in the defense and raw-materials sectors.

The Federal Finance Ministry itself states the principle: through guarantees, loans, and equity stakes, the state deliberately assumes part of the risk, thereby opening space for a multiple of that amount in private investment. Economics Minister Katherina Reiche called the fund a “safe harbor” for private capital. Ulrich Reuter, president of the German Savings Banks Association, put the logic even more openly: government guarantees could help make infrastructure investments attractive to more investors.

After 6 months, the Federal Finance Ministry published an interim assessment on July 15, 2026. The Raw Materials Fund had provided €150 million in equity for lithium production by Vulcan Energy Resources and €50 million for a rare-earth project by Arafura Rare Earths. Stakes had been acquired in German technology start-ups. And 1 sentence in the announcement deserves particular attention: through securitization, the Germany Fund is intended to connect small and medium-sized businesses with capital markets. The securitization module has begun operating.

Securitization. That is precisely the legislative and regulatory initiative BlackRock lists in the Lobby Register – with the stated goal of broadening the investor base to support infrastructure and small and medium-sized businesses.

The second component is the Business Location Promotion Act. The cabinet approved it on September 10, 2025, the Bundestag on December 19, 2025, and the Bundesrat on January 30, 2026; it was promulgated in February 2026. The federal government says the law creates more opportunities for investment funds, particularly to invest more heavily in renewable energy and infrastructure. Klingbeil put it this way: money invested in funds should flow more strongly to where it is needed.

In concrete terms, the law significantly expands the investment options available to funds – including generally unlimited investments in commercial partnerships and all types of other funds, such as European Long-Term Investment Funds. ELTIF. The very structure whose full potential BlackRock urged the European Commission to realize. The law also reduces bureaucracy in financial markets and streamlines supervisory processes at BaFin.

BlackRock’s own strategy shows why this is more than specialist policy. The group acquired Global Infrastructure Partners in 2024 and private-credit specialist HPS Investment Partners, Preqin, and ElmTree in 2025. Fink writes that BlackRock entered 2026 with the combined strength of BlackRock, GIP, HPS, and Preqin. GIP’s fifth flagship fund closed at $25.2 billion. By 2030, BlackRock aims to raise $400 billion in gross capital across private markets. At year-end, the company managed $676 billion in alternative assets, according to the news service Semafor.

Here too, the counterargument is substantial. Germany’s investment gap is undisputed; the Federal Finance Ministry estimates that the need over the next 10 years alone amounts to hundreds of billions of euros and notes that public funds alone cannot cover it. Government guarantees do not automatically mean government losses. BlackRock is one of many potential providers of capital – insurers, savings banks, pension funds, and European competitors such as Amundi are also available. And no German mandate for BlackRock under the Germany Fund has been documented to date. None is publicly recorded.

The finding is therefore not that BlackRock is already collecting the money. It is that the government is creating a new class of publicly prepared, partially state-backed investment assets – in precisely the sectors in which BlackRock has invested billions and from which it expects its future growth.

Rheinmetall: The Case Study

No subject in this debate is misrepresented more often than this one. The numbers therefore come first, to the extent they can be documented – and the limit of what can be documented is itself a finding.

The latest identifiable BlackRock voting-rights notification concerning Rheinmetall dates from February 2024. It reports 5.26 percent of voting rights and 0.32 percent in instruments, for a combined 5.58 percent based on 43,558,850 voting rights. BlackRock Asset Management Deutschland AG and iShares (DE) I Investmentaktiengesellschaft appear in the chain of attributable entities. Before that, the figure was 5.06 percent in August 2023.

Since then: nothing. This is not due to a lack of research, but to the design of Germany’s Securities Trading Act. Voting-rights notifications are triggered only when specified thresholds are crossed in either direction – 3, 5, 10, 15, 20, or 25 percent. The absence of a notification since early 2024 means that the 10-percent threshold was not crossed. The public does not learn what happens within that corridor. Rheinmetall’s own shareholder structure as of December 31, 2025 reports only that institutional investors hold 58 percent of the shares and retail investors 28 percent. It does not identify individual shareholders. Anyone discussing holdings in a defense company during the Federal Republic’s largest rearmament program is working with a figure more than 2 years old. That is the current level of transparency.

Now to attribution, where discipline is required. Rheinmetall’s share price began rising in February 2022, driven by Russia’s attack on Ukraine and the Scholz government’s decision to establish the special defense fund. Attributing that increase to Merz would simply be wrong. Merz has been chancellor since May 6, 2025. What can be attributed to him are decisions taken after that date. And even there, fund investors benefit first, not the manager. BlackRock’s advantage lies in the increase in assets under management and the fees charged on them – indirect, but measurable.

The share price can move in the other direction as well: in June 2026, Rheinmetall shares fell by double digits after the federal government planned to switch frigate suppliers. An asset manager charging fees on assets under management earns less on days like that. Anyone describing the arms boom as a guaranteed win for BlackRock is describing it incorrectly.

The neutrality framework must be stated explicitly: German rearmament can be fully justified on security-policy grounds, and a substantial part of the political and academic debate does exactly that. The convergence of interests exists regardless of whether BlackRock has ever exercised any influence. It is a finding about structures, not a statement about motives.

Ukraine: Who Pays, Who Advises, Who Invests

In Ukraine, 3 levels overlap that public debate routinely confuses.

First, what is documented. In September 2022, Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Larry Fink spoke by video about establishing a reconstruction fund. On November 10, 2022, Ukraine’s Economy Ministry and BlackRock Financial Markets Advisory signed a memorandum of understanding in Washington: under the agreement, BlackRock FMA would advise on a road map for implementing an investment framework, including design options for its setup, structure, mandate, and governance. On December 28, 2022, Ukraine’s Presidential Office reported that both sides intended to focus on coordinating the efforts of all potential investors and directing investment into key sectors. According to BlackRock, the initial advice was provided without charge. The wording of the memorandum was published by NachDenkSeiten.

Second, the plausible future business. Structuring an investment framework does not automatically make the adviser its future manager. But it does mean the adviser knows the framework better than any competitor. Capital intermediation, infrastructure investment, fund management, private credit, and risk consulting – each is a separate source of revenue, and none has yet been documented as an exclusive mandate for BlackRock.

Third, the political financing. In December 2025, the financial outlet InvestmentWeek reported on a confidential U.S. paper concerning Ukraine’s economic reconstruction that had reportedly been sent to European governments not for discussion, but for their information. During a conversation between Zelenskyy and U.S. negotiators Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Larry Fink reportedly joined the call. According to the report, approximately €183 billion in frozen Russian assets are central to the plan; professional asset management is supposed to grow the fund to as much as $800 billion. This is a media report, not a primary source, and it is identified here as such.

Ukraine’s prime minister, Yulia Svyrydenko, did confirm that after an online meeting with Witkoff, Kushner, and Fink, a joint working group had been established with BlackRock whose primary task was the rapid preparation of an action plan.

And the German chancellor? On December 15, 2025, Merz addressed hundreds of business representatives at the 8th German-Ukrainian Business Forum in Berlin. “Investments in Ukraine are investments in the future – including for you,” he told them, according to the taz. Addressing Vladimir Putin, he added: “We are not relenting; we are stepping up.” Economics Minister Reiche said Germany was the largest donor country and was therefore entirely justified in demanding that German companies participate in contracts.

The counterargument is that Ukraine’s reconstruction will not be financeable without private capital – almost everyone involved agrees on that. BlackRock initially provided advice without charge. JPMorgan, McKinsey, and a range of international institutions are involved alongside BlackRock. And Merz’s effort to promote German investment in Ukraine can be fully explained by German industrial interests without any reference to a former employer.

Not Just Merz: The Revolving Door as a System of Government

Anyone who regards the Merz case as an exception has not examined the cabinet.

Economics Minister Katherina Reiche was still listed in the Bundestag’s Lobby Register as a representative of the energy company Westenergie on the morning she took office in May 2025; the entry disappeared around noon. Abgeordnetenwatch documented this. Digital Minister Karsten Wildberger was likewise still registered as a lobbyist – as CEO of an electronics group and vice president of the CDU Economic Council, the association of which Merz had previously served as vice president.

The route also works in the opposite direction. Jörg Kukies moved from Goldman Sachs to the Federal Finance Ministry in 2018, became state secretary in the Chancellery, and ultimately finance minister. After the change of government, he joined Morgan Stanley. The federal government imposed a 12-month cooling-off period; he may assume leadership responsibilities and engage in lobbying after 18 months. Abgeordnetenwatch observes dryly that political networks do not disappear after 18 months, and the organization calls for 3 years.

According to research by Abgeordnetenwatch, at least 16 former employees of federal ministries have taken lobbying jobs since the change of government, including 2 state secretaries. Germany still has no reverse cooling-off period governing moves from business into politics.

That explains why Merz’s proximity to BlackRock receives little attention in the Bundestag. It is not an anomaly. It is the rule.

What Can Be Documented – and What Cannot

What can be documented is this: in 2016, BlackRock expressly tasked Merz with promoting relations with clients, regulators, and regulatory authorities in Germany. BlackRock publicly published its financial-policy program – individual investment accounts, regular saving in small amounts, automatic enrollment, default products, funded pensions, access to private markets, ELTIFs, and securitization. BlackRock sent registered submissions on these subjects to the Federal Chancellery on June 13, 2025 and March 6, 2026. Since May 2025, the Merz government has initiated the retirement-investment account, the Frühstart-Rente, the Business Location Promotion Act, and the Germany Fund – covering a substantial part of that program. Larry Fink devotes an entire chapter of his annual chairman’s letter to Germany. More than half of BlackRock’s assets under management are connected to retirement.

What is plausible is that BlackRock will benefit from larger capital flows and new infrastructure markets. The company is a potential provider of products and mandates. Rising assets under management increase fee revenue.

What cannot be documented is this: instructions to Merz. Secret agreements. Promised mandates. Personal enrichment while in office. A chancellorship controlled by BlackRock. None of that is alleged here because none of it is supported by evidence.

And a contrary finding must also be included in the balance sheet: on the statutory funded pension – the largest single component of the entire transformation – the government has expressly not followed BlackRock. A public fund comes first, the cost cap is 0.1 percent, and the number of certified alternatives is deliberately small. That is the opposite of what the company demands in the register.

But this cap does not determine whether private capital will be managed. It determines who will be allowed to manage it. And that decision will be made in the coming months, during a legislative process scheduled for completion by the end of 2026. Who will manage the public fund? Which providers will be certified? According to what criteria?

That is the question that should be put to a chancellor who was paid for 4 years to cultivate an asset manager’s relations with German regulatory authorities. Not whether he receives instructions. But how much structural alignment can exist between a government’s policies and the business model of its leader’s former employer before disclosure alone is no longer enough.

Geopolitics without camp thinking – weekly clearly explained.

About the Author

Michael Hollister
is a geopolitical analyst and investigative journalist. He served six years in the German military, including peacekeeping deployments in the Balkans (SFOR, KFOR), followed by 14 years in IT security management. His analysis draws on primary sources to examine European militarization, Western intervention policy, and shifting power dynamics across Asia. A particular focus of his work lies in Southeast Asia, where he investigates strategic dependencies, spheres of influence, and security architectures. Hollister combines operational insider perspective with uncompromising systemic critique – beyond opinion journalism. His work appears on his bilingual website (German/English) www.michael-hollister.com and in investigative outlets across the German-speaking world and the Anglosphere.

If you value independent analysis on geopolitics, international relations, and global affairs, consider supporting this publication. Your contribution helps keep this Webpage open and accessible to everyone.

Sources

Primary Sources: BlackRock

  1. German Bundestag Lobby Register – Entry for “BlackRock Asset Management Deutschland AG,” R003422 (First Registered March 14, 2022; Last Amended March 19, 2026): https://www.lobbyregister.bundestag.de/suche/R003422
  2. BlackRock, March 7, 2025 – Response to the European Commission Call for Evidence on the Savings and Investments Union: https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/070325-blackrock-response-ec-call-for-evidence-savings-and-investments-union.pdf
  3. Larry Fink, 2026 – Growing with Your Country: Thoughts from a Long-Term Optimist – Annual Chairman’s Letter 2026 (Full PDF): https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/presentation/larry-fink-annual-chairmans-letter.pdf
  4. BlackRock – Larry Fink’s 2026 Annual Chairman’s Letter to Investors (Overview Page with Germany Passage and Footnotes): https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/larry-fink-annual-chairmans-letter
  5. BlackRock Asset Management Deutschland AG – 2024 Annual Financial Statements with Audit Opinion by Forvis Mazars, Filed with the Lobby Register: https://www.lobbyregister.bundestag.de/media/eb/6d/708191/BlackRock_Asset_Management_Deutschland_AG-132731_PJA_2024_Testat.pdf

Primary Sources: Federal Government and Bundestag

  1. Federal Ministry of Finance, December 18, 2025 – Germany Fund Launches: Federal Government and KfW Provide Significant Impetus: https://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Pressemitteilungen/Finanzpolitik/2025/12/2025-12-18-deutschlandfonds-startet.html
  2. Federal Ministry of Finance, July 15, 2026 – Successful First Half-Year for the Germany Fund: https://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Pressemitteilungen/Finanzpolitik/2026/07/2026-07-15-deutschlandfonds-erfolgreich.html
  3. Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy – Germany Fund Dossier: https://www.bundeswirtschaftsministerium.de/Redaktion/DE/Dossier/deutschlandfonds.html
  4. Federal Government, December 18, 2025 – Germany Fund: Investment for More Growth: https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/deutschlandfonds-gestartet-2400860
  5. KfW – The Germany Fund: Private Investment for Germany’s Future: https://www.kfw.de/Über-die-KfW/Newsroom/Aktuelles/Deutschlandfonds.html
  6. Federal Ministry of Finance, Monthly Report, September 2025 – The Business Location Promotion Act: More Private Investment in Germany: https://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Monatsberichte/Ausgabe/2025/09/Inhalte/Kapitel-2-Fokus/standortfoerdergesetz.html
  7. Federal Government – Cabinet Decision on the Business Location Promotion Act: Securing Growth and Jobs: https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/standortfoerdergesetz-2383774
  8. German Bundestag, December 19, 2025 – Bundestag Passes the Business Location Promotion Act: https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2025/kw51-de-standortfoerdergesetz-1129264
  9. Federal Government, December 17, 2025 – Cabinet Approves Key Points of the Frühstart-Rente: https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/kabinett-fruehstart-rente-2399880
  10. Federal Ministry of Finance – Questions and Answers on the Frühstart-Rente: https://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/FAQ/fruehstart-rente.html
  11. Federal Ministry of Finance, Monthly Report, January 2026 – A New Start for Private Retirement Provision: https://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Monatsberichte/Ausgabe/2026/01/Inhalte/Kapitel-2-Analysen/2-2-neustart-fuer-die-private-altersvorsorge.html
  12. Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs – Pension Commission 2026: The 33 Recommendations: https://www.bmas.de/DE/Soziales/Rente-und-Altersvorsorge/Rentenreform-2025/Rentenkommission-2026/rentenkommission-2026.html
  13. Federal Government, July 2, 2026 – FAQ on the Old-Age Security Commission’s Report: https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/faq-rentenreform-2444534

Primary Sources: Rheinmetall

  1. Rheinmetall AG – Shareholder Structure as of December 31, 2025: https://ir.rheinmetall.com/de/investor-relations/aktie/aktionaersstruktur
  2. Rheinmetall AG – Overview of Voting-Rights Notifications: https://ir.rheinmetall.com/de/investor-relations/veroeffentlichungen/stimmrechtsmitteilungen
  3. BlackRock/Rheinmetall Voting-Rights Notification under Section 40(1) of the German Securities Trading Act, Published February 1, 2024 (5.26% Voting Rights; 0.32% Instruments): https://www.boerse-online.de/dpa-afx/eqs-stimmrechte-rheinmetall-ag-deutsch-346893.html
  4. BlackRock/Rheinmetall Voting-Rights Notification, Published August 10, 2023 (5.06%): https://www.handelsmeldungen.de/article/rheinmetall-ag-erhoeht-stimmrechtsanteile-black-rock-inc-steigt-auf-5-06-veroeffentlichung-gemaess-01H7FZAS2T02SM8YKB4PAHGJMH

Merz and BlackRock

  1. Lobbypedia – Friedrich Merz (Description of His BlackRock Role in 2016; List of Positions): https://lobbypedia.de/wiki/Friedrich_Merz
  2. Lobbypedia – BlackRock (Lobbying Expenditure; EU Transparency Register): https://lobbypedia.de/wiki/Blackrock
  3. t-online, November 2024 – BlackRock Chief Discusses the Chancellor Candidate’s Income (Dirk Schmitz on Compensation): https://www.t-online.de/nachrichten/deutschland/innenpolitik/id_100528720/friedrich-merz-blackrock-chef-spricht-ueber-das-gehalt-des-cdu-chefs.html
  4. Wirtschaftswoche, January 2025 – Davos 2025: Friedrich Merz Has Already Won the Contest against Olaf Scholz (Fink Dinner): https://www.wiwo.de/politik/deutschland/weltwirtschaftsforum-2025-dieses-duell-gegen-olaf-scholz-hat-friedrich-merz-schon-gewonnen/30178610.html
  5. junge Welt, January 27, 2025 – Politics and Financial Power: In BlackRock’s Shadow (Reactions from Mützenich and van Aken): https://www.jungewelt.de/artikel/492658.politik-und-finanzmacht-im-schatten-von-blackrock.html
  6. Multipolar, February 17, 2025 – Merz Opponents Warn of “BlackRock in the Chancellery”: https://multipolar-magazin.de/meldungen/0183

Funded Pension and Pension Reform

  1. Pfefferminzia – How the Pension Commission Envisions the Funded Pension (Public Fund, KENFO, 0.1-Percent Cost Cap): https://www.pfefferminzia.de/vorsorge/wie-sich-die-rentenkommission-die-kapitalrente-vorstellt/
  2. Economic and Social Research Institute of the Hans Böckler Foundation, June 2026 – Policy Brief No. 99: Recommendations of the Pension Commission: https://www.wsi.de/fpdf/HBS-009418/p_wsi_pb_99_2026.pdf
  3. news.de – The Funded Pension Examined (Example Calculation Based on €3,500 Gross Pay): https://www.news.de/wirtschaft/859759536/kostenloser-renten-rechner-fuer-die-rentenreform-2026-wie-viel-bringt-die-kapitalrente-fuer-meine-rente-spaeter/1/
  4. Wikipedia – Report of the 2026 Pension Commission (Background Facts: Submission, Composition, Reactions): https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bericht_der_Rentenkommission_2026

Business Location Promotion Act and Germany as a Fund Domicile

  1. KPMG – Business Location Promotion Act Promulgated in the Federal Law Gazette (Federal Law Gazette I 2026, No. 33): https://kpmg.com/de/de/themen/2026/02/stofoeg-bgbl.html
  2. Luther Law Firm – It Is Done: Business Location Promotion Act Enters into Force: https://www.luther-lawfirm.com/newsroom/newsletter/detail/es-ist-geschafft-standortfoerdergesetz-in-kraft-getreten
  3. BVI German Investment Funds Association – Position on Infrastructure Investment through Investment Funds (ELTIF; KENFO’s Disadvantage as a German-Domiciled Fund): https://www.bvi.de/positionen/infrastruktur/

Germany Fund: Assessment and Statements

  1. vdiv – Germany Fund: €130 Billion Intended to Mobilize Private Investment (Reiche: “Safe Harbor”): https://vdiv.de/news-details/deutschlandfonds-130-milliarden-euro-sollen-private-investitionen-mobilisieren
  2. Sparkasse.de – Germany Fund: €30 Billion for Investment (Statement by Ulrich Reuter, German Savings Banks Association): https://www.sparkasse.de/aktuelles/deutschlandfonds.html

Ukraine

  1. taz, December 2025 – Reconstruction in Ukraine: The Great Known Unknown (8th German-Ukrainian Business Forum; Merz Statements; Svyrydenko on the Working Group): https://taz.de/Wiederaufbau-in-der-Ukraine/!6138839/
  2. InvestmentWeek, December 11, 2025 – Why BlackRock Chief Fink Is Suddenly Involved in Ukraine Negotiations: https://www.investmentweek.com/warum-blackrock-chef-fink-plotzlich-bei-ukraine-verhandlungen-mitmischt/
  3. NachDenkSeiten – U.S. Investment Firm BlackRock to Coordinate Ukraine’s Reconstruction on Zelenskyy’s Behalf (Memorandum of Understanding of November 10, 2022; Text of the Agreement): https://www.nachdenkseiten.de/?p=92625
  4. Transition News, December 2022 – Zelenskyy and BlackRock Agree to Coordinate Ukraine’s Reconstruction: https://transition-news.org/selenski-und-blackrock-vereinbaren-koordination-fur-den-wiederaufbau-der

The Revolving Door

  1. Abgeordnetenwatch – From BlackRock’s Supervisory Board to the Chancellery: The Merz Government’s Lobbying File: https://www.abgeordnetenwatch.de/recherchen/lobbyismus/die-lobby-akte-der-regierung-merz
  2. Abgeordnetenwatch – From Ministries to Lobbying Jobs: The Merz Government’s Revolving Door (At Least 16 Moves; Kukies/Morgan Stanley; Cooling-Off Periods): https://www.abgeordnetenwatch.de/recherchen/lobbyismus/die-lobbyistinnen-die-aus-den-ministerien-kamen
  3. Abgeordnetenwatch – Katherina Reiche and Her Lobbying Contacts: https://www.abgeordnetenwatch.de/recherchen/informationsfreiheit/katherina-reiche-wirtschaftsministerium-will-tausende-euro-fuer-lobby-unterlagen
  4. taz – The CDU’s Dream Cabinet: Just a Little Lobbying (LobbyControl/Deckwirth on Reiche): https://taz.de/Wunschkabinett-der-Union/!6081456/

BlackRock: Private Markets

  1. Semafor, March 22, 2026 – BlackRock CEO Larry Fink’s 2026 Shareholder Letter ($676 Billion in Alternative Assets; $400 Billion Target): https://www.semafor.com/article/03/22/2026/blackrock-ceo-larry-fink-2026-shareholder-letter

© Michael Hollister – All rights reserved. Redistribution, publication or reuse of this text requires express written permission from the author. For licensing inquiries, please contact the author via www.michael-hollister.com

PDF 📄

Mehr zu diesem Thema