Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the Idea of an “Arab NATO Light”

New Power Architectures in the Middle East

from Michael Hollister

First published at FREE21 Magazine on November 15, 2025

1.790 words * 9 minutes readingtime

A Pact with Signal Power

On September 17, 2025, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a defense agreement in Riyadh that goes far beyond typical military cooperation treaties. The core: an attack on one country shall be considered an attack on both (Al Jazeera, Sept. 17, 2025; Reuters, Sept. 17, 2025). With this move, two states that at first glance appear vastly different—an oil-rich Gulf state and a South Asian nuclear power—are sending a signal into a region marked by insecurity, wars, and geopolitical competition. While Pakistan strengthens its strategic relevance in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia gains an additional security guarantee that doesn’t come from Washington. In an era when the US is tied down by Ukraine, China, and domestic tensions, this represents a potential tectonic shift—but how realistic is the leap from a bilateral treaty to an “Arab NATO”? This analysis maps possible trajectories without confusing policy already underway with future scenarios.

Why Now?

The agreement comes during a phase of increasing destabilization in the Middle East. Various actors view the regional security situation as increasingly precarious. Since October 2023, Israel has conducted an intensive military campaign in Gaza and expanded its operations to neighboring states. Reports document strikes on Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and according to various sources, also on Qatar, Tunisia, and even Iraq; individual operations are also located in Iran (Al Jazeera, Sept. 10, 2025; Al Jazeera, Aug. 1, 2024).

Simultaneously, civilian casualties have risen to staggering levels according to Palestinian and UN figures. Estimates by Palestinian authorities suggest more than 60,000 civilian deaths in Gaza, many of them women and children (The Guardian, Sept. 19, 2025). While various UN bodies offer different assessments, a UN Special Rapporteur openly spoke of genocide allegations (The Guardian, Sept. 16, 2025; Amnesty International, Sept. 18, 2025). These figures and assessments have—independent of their legal evaluation—fueled fears of an uncontrollable regional conflagration and explain why states like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are seeking new security architectures.

Nuclear Weapons as Deterrence: Pakistan’s Nuclear Card

At the heart of the agreement lies the nuclear dimension. Pakistan possesses an arsenal of more than 150 nuclear warheads (Belfer Center, 2025)—ranging from tactical short-range Nasr missiles with 60km range to Shaheen-III medium-range missiles with 2,750km range. By signing this treaty, the country signals it would be willing to indirectly place this potential in service of a partner like Saudi Arabia. For Riyadh, this means: a protective umbrella that extends beyond conventional deterrence.

Whether Pakistan would actually play the nuclear card in a crisis remains questionable. Historical experience—such as the Cold War between the US and Soviet Union—shows that nuclear weapons operate primarily politically. The crucial point isn’t their use, but the credibility of the threat. This is precisely where the SA-PK agreement strikes: it creates uncertainty among potential aggressors about whether an action against Saudi Arabia might not trigger a domino effect (Washington Institute, Sept. 19, 2025).

Technical Foundations of a Possible Alliance

Military cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan builds on already existing complementarities. Saudi Arabia possesses modern Western systems: F-15SA fighter jets, Eurofighter Typhoons, Patriot missile defense, and the advanced THAAD system. Pakistan, meanwhile, brings Chinese technology—JF-17 Thunder fighters, HQ-9 air defense, and experience handling asymmetric threats.

Interoperability would be a challenge, but not insurmountable. Both countries already use NATO-standard Link-16 data systems, and Pakistan has experience integrating diverse weapons systems. Joint command and control centers, as already exist between the UAE and Saudi Arabia, could serve as blueprints.

From Mini-Alliance to “Arab NATO”?

From the perspective of the involved actors, this could be the starting point of a broader alliance—a kind of “Arab NATO light.” Regional security formats already exist today, such as the Arab League with its 1950 Defense Treaty or the Gulf Cooperation Council’s Peninsula Shield Force. But both are considered toothless, lacking military striking power and common political resolve (ISPIONLINE, 2025).

An alliance with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan as its core could theoretically fill this gap. With additional partners—such as the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, and potentially Syria or Yemen—a bloc could emerge that combines military deterrence with economic power.

Delhi’s Dilemma: India’s Growing Concerns

A critical aspect often overlooked in Western analysis is India’s position. New Delhi is watching the Pakistani-Saudi rapprochement with growing unease—and for several reasons.

First, the alliance significantly strengthens Pakistan’s regional position. With Saudi petrodollars backing it, Islamabad could ease its chronic financial problems while simultaneously building up militarily. Second, it opens an additional strategic space for Pakistan beyond the traditional China axis.

Particularly explosive: India itself maintains close ties to the Gulf states, especially the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Around 8.5 million Indians work in the Gulf region and remit over $50 billion annually to their homeland. A stronger Pakistani presence in the Gulf could complicate these economic relationships.

Militarily, India now faces a Pakistan potentially backed by a nuclear power plus oil money. This sharpens the strategic dilemma in an already tense relationship marked by four wars and the ongoing Kashmir conflict.

Can Rivalries Be Overcome?

Critics point to internal fault lines in the Arab world: Qatar and Saudi Arabia, UAE and Egypt, the Syria question, divergent Iran policies. But alliances exist precisely to channel rivalries when strategic benefit is large enough.

NATO united decades-long archenemies like France and Germany. BRICS today brings India and China to the table despite serious border disputes (Times of India, Sept. 18, 2025). Russia and China evolved from rivals to strategic partners.

The lesson: when pressure is high enough—whether from external threats or the need to gain autonomy from the US—regional rivalries can recede into the background.

BRICS as Geopolitical Lever

The scenario becomes particularly interesting with possible BRICS integration. The group is actively expanding; Saudi Arabia and the UAE have already been invited (Reuters, Aug. 31, 2023). With Pakistan as a member or close partner, a security and economic bloc could emerge with not only military but also economic weight.

The BRICS dynamic opens new pathways: oil deals could increasingly be settled in renminbi or other currencies (Reuters, Jan. 17, 2024), the New Development Bank would offer alternative financing, and projects like mBridge create technical alternatives to the dollar system. For Arab states shaped by the US dollar for decades, this would be a step toward greater autonomy.

Washington Under Pressure

The US faces a strategic dilemma. A coalition that integrates a nuclear power and could indirectly constrain Israel would be an open challenge to the existing Middle Eastern order.

But the US has limited capacity. With the war in Ukraine and competition with China, its strategic room for maneuver is constricted (CFR, 2025). A new major conflict in the Middle East isn’t in US interests. More likely is that Washington would respond through a combination of diplomatic pressure, selective sanctions, and arms controls—military intervention currently seems unrealistic.

Practical Implementation: What Would Be Possible?

Militarily, initial steps could follow quickly:

• Joint airspace surveillance through networked radar systems
• Coordinated missile defense (Patriot, THAAD, HQ-9)
• Joint maritime operations in the Red Sea and Arabian Gulf
• Anti-drone capabilities (already a focus for both countries)
• Joint cyber defense centers

A realistic phased model could look like this:

Phase 1 (0-6 months): Expansion of the SA-PK core, bilateral agreements with UAE, Bahrain. First joint command and control exercises, data exchange between air defense systems.

Phase 2 (6-18 months): Construction of integrated air picture systems, coordinated missile defense, joint sea patrols in the Red Sea against Houthi drones.

Phase 3 (12-36 months): Economic integration: oil sales in alternative currencies, use of BRICS payment systems.

Phase 4 (3-10 years): Institutionalization with joint staffs, regional command centers, coordinated UN diplomacy.

Risks Cannot Be Dismissed

1. Escalation danger: Vague mutual assistance formulations carry risk of miscalculation.
2. India’s counterreaction: New Delhi could seek closer military cooperation with Israel and the US.
3. US sanctions: Technology restrictions would be conceivable should the alliance openly turn anti-Western.
4. Internal differences: Without clear decision mechanisms, paralysis threatens.
5. Economic complexity: De-dollarization is a long-term process.

Conclusion: More Than Symbolic Politics

The defense agreement between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan is more than diplomatic theater. It could—emphasis on could—be the starting point of a new security architecture in the Middle East. An “Arab NATO light” that combines military deterrence, economic integration, and political bloc formation.

The probability it becomes a formal NATO-like alliance remains low. Internal fractures are too large and institutional integration hurdles too high. More likely is a modular approach: a core of SA-PK, supplemented by bilateral partners and graduated cooperation formats.

Yet even in diluted form, this bloc could unfold geopolitical effect: it would caution potential aggressors, reduce US dependence, and open new strategic options for the Middle East. Critical is whether the involved states invest early in credibility, technical interoperability, and de-escalation mechanisms. Only then can “Arab NATO light” evolve from a political signal to a stabilizing factor.

In a world where the US no longer dominates unchallenged and China and Russia offer alternative order models, regional powers are experimenting with new alliances. The SA-PK agreement is another building block in this multipolar reality—with consequences far beyond the Middle East.

Sources (Selection)

1. Al Jazeera, September 17, 2025: “Saudi Arabia signs mutual defence pact with nuclear-armed Pakistan”
2. Reuters, September 17, 2025: “Saudi Arabia, nuclear-armed Pakistan sign mutual defence pact”
3. Al Jazeera, September 10, 2025: “Maps: Israel has attacked six countries in the past 72 hours”
4. Al Jazeera, August 1, 2024: “What countries has Israel attacked since October 7?”
5. The Guardian, September 16, 2025: “UN inquiry finds Israel committing genocide in Gaza”
6. The Guardian, September 19, 2025: “Civilians made up 15 of every 16 people Israel killed in Gaza since March”
7. Amnesty International, September 18, 2025: “UN report concluding Israel committing genocide in Gaza must spur action”
8. Washington Institute, September 19, 2025: “Will Saudi-Pakistan defence pact have proliferation consequences?”
9. Belfer Center, 2025: “Beyond the hype: Pakistan-Saudi defense pact”
10. Times of India, September 18, 2025: “Pakistan calls Saudi pact defensive arrangement, likens it to NATO”
11. ISPIONLINE, 2025: “Saudi-Pakistan pact implications for India, US, Gulf”
12. Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), 2025: “Israeli-Palestinian conflict tracker”
13. CFR, 2025: “War in Yemen conflict tracker”
14. Human Rights Watch, June 4, 2025: “Yemen: US Strikes on Port an Apparent War Crime”
15. Reuters, August 31, 2023: “BRICS expansion and implications for de-dollarisation”
16. Reuters, January 17, 2024: “China’s mBridge cross-border payments project advances with Gulf participation”

© Michael Hollister— Redistribution, publication or reuse of this text is explicitly welcome. The only requirement is proper source attribution and a link to www.michael-hollister.com (or in printed form the note “Source: www.michael-hollister.com”).

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