Venezuela: Breaking Democracy

Venezuela’s Abduction and the End of the Rules-Based World Order

by Michael Hollister
Exclusive published at Michael Hollister on January 18, 2026

3.128 words * 17 minutes readingtime

I. The Precedent – Why Venezuela Shakes the World Order

On January 3, 2026, U.S. forces bombed targets in Caracas, deployed special operations units, and took into custody the sitting president, Nicolás Maduro, along with his wife, Cilia Flores. Both were transferred to the United States to face drug trafficking and terrorism charges before a federal court in New York. In the days that followed, the U.S. seized five oil tankers carrying Venezuelan crude on the high seas.

These events mark an unprecedented rupture with established international norms—not merely a direct application of military force against a sovereign state, but the forcible abduction of its president. They thus raise fundamental questions about the validity and enforceability of international law in the twenty-first century.

That this step was coming was foreseeable. Already in December 2025, several think tanks—including RAND and CSIS—had identified “decapitation strikes” against the Venezuelan leadership as a strategic option. A detailed article from December 5, 2025, documented these recommendations and predicted the intervention with precision—including Maduro’s arrest.

The core question of this article is: What does this precedent mean for international law, multilateralism, and the capacity of multilateral institutions like the United Nations to enforce norms when powerful states openly ignore them?

For if a state with the world’s most powerful military and economic apparatus—such as the United States—systematically violates fundamental norms of international law without experiencing any tangible legal or political consequences, then what is at stake is nothing less than the existence of an international order based on the rule of law rather than the law of the strongest.

II. Legal Assessment – A Cumulative Breach

The U.S. military intervention in Venezuela, the arrest of a sitting head of state, and the seizure of multiple merchant tankers on the high seas do not constitute an isolated violation of rules. Rather, they represent a cumulative breach of core norms of international law, the law of the sea, and the fundamental separation between domestic and international law.

A. Prohibition on the Use of Force – Article 2(4) of the UN Charter

The cornerstone of the postwar international order is the general prohibition on the use of force. Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations prohibits any use of military force against the territorial integrity or political independence of a state.

• The U.S. military operation in Caracas (airstrikes, special forces, armed operations) constitutes a classic application of military force
• No UN Security Council mandate was in place
• Venezuela had not committed an armed attack against the United States

Result: A clear violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.

B. No Justification Through Self-Defense

Article 51 of the UN Charter permits military force exclusively in the event of an armed attack. Venezuela did not attack the United States militarily. Allegations such as drug trafficking, terrorism, or sanctions evasion do not constitute an armed attack. Even if criminal charges were valid, they do not justify military intervention.

Result: The invocation of Article 51 is not tenable under international law.

C. Violation of State Sovereignty and Immunity

The arrest of a sitting president on the territory of his state violates several core principles simultaneously: the sovereignty of the Venezuelan state, political independence, and the principle of non-interference in internal affairs. A sitting president enjoys personal immunity (immunity ratione personae). This immunity is absolute, regardless of political or criminal accusations.

Result: The arrest of Nicolás Maduro constitutes a severe breach of customary international law.

D. Violation of the International Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)

Under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state and freedom of navigation apply on the high seas. The seizure of five oil tankers occurred outside U.S. territorial waters, without a UN mandate, and without the consent of the respective flag states.

UNCLOS permits the boarding of foreign vessels only in narrowly defined cases: piracy, slave trade, statelessness, or emergency. None of these conditions applied. Categories such as “sanctioned oil,” “shadow fleet,” or “circumvention of U.S. law” are not categories recognized by the international law of the sea.

Result: Violation of freedom of the seas and Articles 87 and 92 of UNCLOS.

E. Extraterritorial Application of Domestic Law

The United States invokes OFAC sanctions law, U.S. court orders, and domestic criminal statutes. These legal instruments apply only within U.S. legal jurisdiction, not automatically on the international plane. No state is obligated to comply with U.S. domestic law worldwide in the absence of an international mandate.

Result: The global enforcement of U.S. domestic law is impermissible under international law.

Interim conclusion: The U.S. measures violate simultaneously and cumulatively the prohibition on the use of force under the UN Charter, Venezuela’s sovereignty, the personal immunity of a head of state, the international law of the sea, and the boundary between domestic and international law. This is not a borderline case, no gray zone, no legal misunderstanding—but an open breach of the existing international legal order.

III. The UN – Debating Club Instead of Enforcement Body

Immediately after the events became known, Russia and Venezuela called for an emergency session of the UN Security Council. China, Cuba, and Iran supported this demand and described the U.S. actions as “violations of international law” and, in part, as “modern piracy”. UN Secretary-General António Guterres expressed “deep concern” over the “erosion of international norms.”

Yet despite these reactions, what always happens when the aggressor is a veto power occurred: no binding resolution followed. No investigative mandate. No sanction. The Security Council remained effectively paralyzed—not because no wrongdoing was recognized, but because the U.S. veto killed any concrete measure in its infancy.

The UN Charter grants the five permanent members of the Security Council—the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, and France—a permanent veto. In reality, this has become an instrument of structural paralysis: the U.S. blocks measures against itself, Russia blocks resolutions on Syria or Ukraine, China blocks measures on Taiwan or Xinjiang.

The result: The UN is increasingly what many observers call a “symbolic world parliament without executive power.” A place where injustice is named but not punished. A system that formulates rules but no longer produces binding consequences when those rules are broken—at least not by the powerful.

IV. Why the U.S. Does This – Strategy, Not Coincidence

The legal assessment of the U.S. military operation yields a clear picture: a massive breach of international law. But legally impermissible does not mean irrational in international politics. Behind the U.S. offensive lies concrete interests.

A. Control Over Oil and Cutting Off China

Venezuela possesses an estimated 303 billion barrels of proven oil reserves—the largest in the world, surpassing Saudi Arabia. Under Nicolás Maduro, Venezuela was economically tightly bound to China—roughly 90% of Venezuelan oil exports went to China, often in the form of commodity collateral for loans. Exports were increasingly conducted in yuan, Tether, or through barter for infrastructure—outside the dollar system.

Over the past 15 years, China invested around $70 billion in Venezuelan infrastructure projects, refineries, and telecommunications. Whoever controls Caracas controls not only oil—but also Chinese capital.

B. Monroe Doctrine 2.0 – The Hemisphere as a Sphere of Influence

The Monroe Doctrine of 1823 holds that any interference by external powers in the Western Hemisphere will be regarded as a hostile act. What was still rhetorically invoked under Obama and Bush received a strategic charge under Trump—often unofficially referred to as the “Trump Corollary”: No military presence of Russia, China, or Iran in Latin America. No access by these powers to energy infrastructure, seaports, or political spheres of influence.

Venezuela was—after Cuba—the last remaining bulwark against these hegemonic claims. The break with Venezuela was more than a sanctions conflict. Caracas became a testing ground for a new American foreign policy that openly violates the sovereignty of other states when deemed necessary.

C. Think Tank Strategy: RAND, NSS, and the Indo-Pacific

The U.S. National Security Strategy 2025 makes it clear: “The Indo-Pacific is the center of the geopolitical struggle of the twenty-first century.” The strategic reorientation toward the Indo-Pacific is no accident—it follows precisely the recommendations of the RAND Corporation, which has formulated an aggressive containment strategy toward China in multiple studies.

Several RAND studies—particularly Extending Russia, China Containment 2030, and Linking the Unthinkable—emphasize: The U.S. has a shrinking time window (2025–2033) to slow China’s strategic rise. The goal is multidimensional containment: financial, digital, military, energy-political.

By controlling Caracas, the U.S. cuts China off from one of its most important raw material partners, prevents the establishment of alternative payment systems (yuan, Tether, gold swaps), and sends a signal to all who bind themselves too closely to China: Whoever binds too tightly to China risks intervention.

For those who wish to understand these connections in detail: This article on the RAND-NSS pipeline provides a comprehensive analysis of the think-tank-to-policy connection.

Interim conclusion: The U.S. operation against Venezuela was neither spontaneous, nor purely symbolic, nor exclusively domestically motivated. It was part of a comprehensive realignment of American foreign policy that is increasingly abandoning the rules-based order—and instead relying on strategic preemption, military coercion, and economic blockade.

V. Neocolonialism 2.0 – Venezuela as a Model Case

The U.S. military action against Venezuela is not merely a geopolitical incident—it is the expression of a structural paradigm shift in global power projection. What is unfolding here is not classical colonialism with flags and governor-generals, but a highly developed system of dependency, control, and targeted destabilization under the cover of democracy, market economy, and human rights.

A. Neocolonialism: Old Control in New Packaging

Neocolonialism refers to the indirect control of a sovereign state through economic, political, financial, or technological dependencies—without formal occupation. What matters is the form of control, not its appearance.

Core features:

• Resource extraction by foreign corporations with simultaneous capital flight
• Currency dependency through U.S. dollar or SWIFT access
• Structural indebtedness and “aid with conditions” programs (IMF, World Bank)
• Political blackmail through sanctions, visa policies, diplomatic isolation
• Media control of Western narratives through international media and platform dominance

In Venezuela’s case, almost all of these points apply—despite formal sovereignty. With control over Venezuela’s oil exports, Washington has a direct lever over state finances, import capacity, and inflation control. The blockade of digital payment systems (Tether, SWIFT, oil export accounts) demonstrates how financial infrastructure is weaponized geopolitically.

B. Neoprotectoratism: Control Without Responsibility

A neoprotectorate is a state that is not formally but de facto under foreign administration or protection, without being legally regarded as a colony. Formal statehood remains intact, but the executive, finances, or security structures are substantially controlled from outside. Decision-making freedom is de facto abolished.

After the military intervention, American and European actors begin building a new “democratic” Venezuela: reconstruction plans with IMF structural programs, reallocation of extraction licenses to Western corporations (Chevron, ExxonMobil, BP), construction of new security structures with the help of USAID, Freedom House, and NED.

All of this occurs under Western control, with local elites as accomplices—a prototypical form of the neoprotectorate, operating under the guise of stability, democracy, and development.

Conclusion: Venezuela is not the target—it is the model case. What functions here will later be repeated in Africa, Southeast Asia, Central Asia.

VI. Smaller States in the Great Power Game – Neutrality Is Not an Option

The U.S. military operation against Venezuela acts like a wildfire in the security-political calculations of smaller states: If a sovereign state can be forcibly destabilized by a great power, its president abducted, and its resources seized—without international consequences—the question arises for many countries: Am I next?

A. Example Serbia – Rearmament as a Signal

Serbia responded in 2025/26 by doubling its military budget—officially in response to tensions in Kosovo. But behind the rhetoric lies more: rearmament of small states today is not merely a regional reflex, but part of a larger geopolitical awakening. Military strengthening means: In the future, they no longer want to merely issue appeals to the UN, but if necessary defend themselves.

Sovereignty must again be actively defended—if necessary, even beyond multilateral guarantees.

B. Southeast Asia: Thailand, Malaysia, and the Quiet Calculation

Southeast Asia has long been regarded as a geopolitically stabilizing region—economically oriented, non-aligned, pragmatic. But since the growing systemic conflict between the U.S. and China, and especially since Venezuela, the calculation has shifted. States such as Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines are increasingly investing in their own strategic autonomy: modernization of navies, expansion of cyber and satellite capabilities, intelligence cooperation with various actors.

In Thailand, the Kra Canal project is being discussed again—an artificial maritime trade route as an alternative to the U.S.-controlled Strait of Malacca. The canal is not only an economic project, but a security valve: “Whoever controls the routes controls our vulnerability.”

In political backrooms, many ASEAN states are asking the same question: “What is more dangerous for us—being under U.S. influence, or becoming a Chinese satellite?” Neither option is truly sovereign—the fear is great of being instrumentalized, for example as a frontline state in a future U.S.-China conflict.

Result: A trend toward targeted multi-alignment—less idealism, more strategic elasticity.

C. The Time of “Non-Blocs” Is Over

States such as Brazil, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, or Egypt are reassessing their options: Where do I get protection if multilateralism fails? Who guarantees me access to technology, capital, markets—without disenfranchising me? Which partner does not intervene in my domestic politics?

The BRICS+ expansion, Chinese security guarantees for Pakistan or Iran, and even Turkish-Russian military agreements show: A new security architecture war has begun—no longer just NATO versus SCO, but a patchwork of new, bilateral arrangements.

In this multipolar world, states align themselves not morally, but functionally: Who guarantees my security, my supply chains, my regime survival?

Conclusion: The Venezuela case has lifted the last veil: If even a resource-rich country with a seat at the UN is not safe, no one is safe. Small and medium-sized states are entering an era in which their security architecture is no longer based on UN conventions, but on national resilience, infrastructure re-sovereignization, and strategic diversification.

VII. Consequences for the International Order

The military action against Venezuela is not merely a precedent in international law—it is a political tipping point. A dominant actor publicly violates core norms of international law and remains completely unscathed. What does this say about the state of the world order—and its future?

A. Erosion of the Rules-Based Order

International law is not defined by its letters, but by its enforceability. When states like the United States openly violate the UN Charter, the law of the sea, and multilateral agreements—and experience no consequences—the credibility of the rules-based order collapses. If the law does not apply equally to all, then it is not law—but merely a mask for power.

The principle of state sovereignty—once inviolable—becomes a bargaining chip. Military interventions, extraterritorial sanctions, asset freeze measures on the high seas: All of this becomes the new “normal”—as long as it comes from the right actor.

B. The Path Toward New Multilateral Order Models

States such as Russia, China, India, Iran, and Brazil are building up their own institutions at high speed: BRICS Plus as an economic counterweight, the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) as a security-political platform, new multilateral agreements designed to bypass the dollar and secure political independence.

Because the global order is no longer perceived as just, many states are reorienting themselves: ASEAN, MERCOSUR, the African Union, and other regional associations are gaining significance. Goal: self-protection through regional solidarity rather than dependence on Washington, Brussels, or Beijing.

The new geopolitical paradox: The world is becoming ever more interconnected, but ever less coordinated. The collapse of the universal order does not lead to new unity—but to a pluriverse of rules: Whoever is strong defines the law. Whoever is weak seeks protection in alternative orders.

VIII. Conclusion – The Question of the Century

The abduction of a sitting president, the military control of a resource-rich state without a UN mandate, the seizure of ships on the high seas in violation of international law—all of this has not only struck Venezuela. It has shaken the global balance of power itself.

Three scenarios emerge:

1. De-escalation through diplomacy: Some states—particularly in Europe, Africa, and Southeast Asia—will attempt to prevent this rupture from becoming systemic. They rely on diplomatic condemnations, strengthening of multilateral bodies, calls for Security Council reform. Problem: These voices go unheard as long as no power stands behind them.

2. Further proxy conflicts: The more likely variant. Venezuela is not an outlier, but a precursor. The United States has shown it is willing to rule militarily, to act even against UN law, and need not fear any significant resistance. Consequence: Further military interventions will be normalized. Rivals such as China and Russia will begin to actively secure their own protective spaces and spheres of influence—possibly preemptively.

3. Reassessment of the global security architecture: The third possibility—and perhaps the only sustainable one—lies in a radical reassessment of the world order by those states that are neither Washington, Beijing, nor Moscow. These “non-hegemonic states” must decide: Do they remain pawns—or do they become actors? Concretely, this means: strengthening regional associations (ASEAN, CELAC, AU), access to alternative financial and legal systems (BRICS currency, multilateral arbitration courts), protection of critical infrastructure through their own security agreements.

Final sentence:

Venezuela was not the end of a world order—but its public collapse. What is now being decided is whether this leads to an anarchic “everyone against everyone”—or whether the states of the world have the courage to create a new, more just order—beyond Monroe, hegemony, and violence.

Michael Hollister is a geopolitical analyst and investigative journalist. He served six years in the German military, including peacekeeping deployments in the Balkans (SFOR, KFOR), followed by 14 years in IT security management. His analysis draws on primary sources to examine European militarization, Western intervention policy, and shifting power dynamics across Asia. A particular focus of his work lies in Southeast Asia, where he investigates strategic dependencies, spheres of influence, and security architectures. Hollister combines operational insider perspective with uncompromising systemic critique—beyond opinion journalism. His work appears on his bilingual website (German/English) www.michael-hollister.com, at Substack at https://michaelhollister.substack.com and in investigative outlets across the German-speaking world and the Anglosphere.

© Michael Hollister — Redistribution, publication or reuse of this text is explicitly welcome. The only requirement is proper source attribution and a link to www.michael-hollister.com (or in printed form the note “Source: www.michael-hollister.com”).

---