How Brussels Suppresses Free Speech Worldwide
US House of Representatives Publishes 160-Page Report with Damning Evidence Against the EU Commission
by Michael Hollister
Published at GlobalBridge on February 07, 2026
4.372 words * 23 minutes readingtime

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The Machinery – How the System Works
I. The Shock
Romania, November 24, 2024. Călin Georgescu, a largely unknown independent candidate, unexpectedly wins the first round of the presidential election with 22.94% of the vote. The political establishment is shocked. Two days later, Romanian intelligence services present a dramatic claim: 25,000 coordinated TikTok accounts, controlled from Russia, had manipulated the election.
On December 6, 2024, the Romanian Constitutional Court unanimously annuls the election—without examining the accusations, without demanding evidence, without a hearing for the candidate. The reason: alleged Russian interference via TikTok. It is the first time in European Union history that a democratic election has been completely annulled after voting.
One day later, on December 7, 2024, TikTok sends an official response to the EU Commission, which had launched a DSA investigation. The statement is unequivocal: “TikTok has not found, nor been presented with, any evidence of a coordinated network of 25,000 accounts associated with Mr. Georgescu’s campaign.”
On December 13, TikTok repeats this statement. No evidence. No coordinated campaign. Nothing.
On December 22, 2024, the Romanian tax authority ANAF reveals: The alleged “Russian” campaign was financed by the Romanian party PNL—an established, pro-Western political force. The entire narrative of Russian interference was a lie.
The election was never reinstated. In May 2025, in a new election, the establishment’s preferred candidate wins. Mission accomplished.
A coup, disguised as “protecting democracy.”
This is not an isolated case. This is system.
On February 3, 2026—just days ago—the US House of Representatives published a 160-page report with a title normally reserved for dictatorships: “The Foreign Censorship Threat, Part II: Europe’s Decade-Long Campaign to Censor the Global Internet and How it Harms American Speech in the United States.”
The House of Representatives calls the EU a “regime.”
On page 13, it states verbatim: “EU-Regime pressured platforms to suppress lawful speech, including speech that was true, simply because it was politically inconvenient.”
Regime. The word is normally used for Putin’s Russia, Assad’s Syria, the Kim regime in North Korea, the Iranian regime. Now: the EU regime.
The documents underlying this report demonstrate: They are right.
This is Part 1 of our investigative series in 8 parts.
Today: How the machinery works.
Tomorrow/Day after: What was concretely done. The crimes. The evidence. The consequences.
II. The Report – A Foundation of Evidence
What is “Foreign Censorship Threat Part II”?
The report comes from the House Judiciary Committee under Chairman Jim Jordan, a close ally of President Donald Trump and tech entrepreneur Elon Musk. It is the result of a comprehensive investigation into how foreign laws—particularly the EU Digital Services Act (DSA)—suppress the free speech of American citizens.
The investigation period spans an entire decade: from 2015, when the first “voluntary” EU initiatives launched, to today, February 2026.
This is the second edition of an ongoing investigative process. Part I appeared in July 2025 and laid the legal groundwork. Part II now brings the evidence—tens of thousands of pages of internal documents showing: It’s even worse than feared.
The Methodology – Why These Accusations Are Court-Proof
This is not political opinion. This is not conspiracy theory. This is legal evidence preservation according to the strictest standards of American congressional investigations.
The Committee issued Subpoenas—legally binding summons with threat of punishment for non-compliance—against ten of the world’s largest technology companies:
- Meta (Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp)
- Google (YouTube, Search)
- TikTok (ByteDance)
- X (formerly Twitter, under Elon Musk)
- Amazon
- Microsoft
- Apple
- Rumble
- OpenAI (ChatGPT)
The companies were legally obligated to hand over all relevant internal documents. Those who refuse risk Contempt of Congress—a criminal offense. The companies cooperated.
The result: Tens of thousands of pages of internal communication:
- Emails between employees, between companies and EU Commission, between various EU departments
- Meeting protocols from over 100 closed meetings since 2020
- Presentations for internal strategy meetings
- Policy documents with Track Changes showing WHAT was changed, WHEN, and WHY
- Strategic planning documents on compliance with EU requirements
Additionally: Managers of these companies gave sworn testimony before the Committee. Under oath. False testimony is punishable by up to five years in prison.
The chain of evidence is seamless. Every claim in the report is supported by internal documents with timestamps, sender information, and traceable communication chains.
An example: When the report says “TikTok changed its Community Guidelines mainly because of DSA compliance,” this is based on an internal TikTok document that literally says: “As advised by the legal team, the updates were mainly related to compliance with the Digital Services Act (DSA).” With date. With author. With context.
These are not speculations. These are facts that would be admitted as evidence in any court in the world.
The Central Indictment
The report documents three main accusations against the EU Commission:
First: The EU Commission has systematically forced social media platforms to change their global content moderation rules to censor true information that was “politically inconvenient.” These changes affected not only EU users but users worldwide—including American citizens.
Second: The EU Commission has interfered in at least eight European elections by pressuring platforms before elections to suppress certain political content—almost exclusively to the detriment of conservative and populist candidates.
Third: The EU Commission has deliberately censored American content and American citizens by forcing platforms to moderate US debates about COVID-19, vaccinations, and the 2024 US presidential election.
All three accusations are supported by internal documents. In black and white.
III. The System – How the Censorship Machinery Works
To understand how the EU enforced this global censorship, one must understand the system. It consists of legal tools, institutional structures, and a massive network of funded organizations.
The Legal Toolkit
1. The Digital Services Act – The Weapon with Billion-Dollar Penalties
The Digital Services Act (DSA) was passed by the European Parliament in October 2022. It has been mandatory since August 2023 for the largest platforms (“Very Large Online Platforms” with over 45 million EU users), and since February 2024 for all online services operating in the EU.
The DSA requires platforms to identify and “mitigate” so-called “systemic risks”—that is, to reduce or eliminate them.
What are these “systemic risks”? The DSA defines them in Articles 34 and 35:
- “Misleading or deceptive content”
- “Disinformation”
- “Any actual or foreseeable negative effects on civic discourse and electoral processes”
- “Hate speech”
- And explicitly: “Information which is not illegal”
Read the last point again. The DSA requires platforms to “mitigate” even legal information if it is classified as a “systemic risk.”
All these terms are vague, subjective, and politically interpretable:
- What is “misleading”? Who decides?
- What is “disinformation”? Is there an objective definition?
- What are “negative effects on civic discourse”? Is criticism of the government a “negative effect”?
- What is “hate speech”? Is “There are only two genders” hate speech? (In Slovakia, it was treated as such.)
There are no clear definitions. The EU Commission interprets these terms. The EU Commission enforces them.
The penalties are draconian:
- Up to 6% of global annual revenue
- For Meta: Over $7 billion
- For Google: Even more
- For smaller platforms: Existential destruction
Additionally, the EU Commission can completely exclude platforms from the EU market. The threat: “Censor what we want, or you’re out.”
For US companies making substantial revenues in the EU, this is an existential threat.
2. The “Voluntary” Codes – Extortion by Announcement
Before the DSA came into force, the EU Commission established two “voluntary” codes of conduct as a test run:
Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online (2016):
Introduced in May 2016. Signatories commit to censoring “hateful conduct” and responding to reports “in less than 24 hours.”
Signatories: Facebook, Instagram, Microsoft, Snapchat, TikTok, Twitter (now X), YouTube.
Code of Practice on Disinformation (2018, comprehensively revised 2022):
Introduced in 2018, massively expanded in 2022. Platforms commit to identifying “disinformation” and “diluting” its visibility—reducing, suppressing, algorithmically disadvantaging it.
The codes explicitly demand changes to content moderation policies. The 2022 Disinformation Code states verbatim that platforms must “put in place or further bolster policies to address both misinformation and disinformation across their services.”
Signatories: Facebook, Google, Microsoft, TikTok, Twitter. (X withdrew in 2023—and was promptly hit with DSA penalties.)
“Voluntary”? A farce.
In 2016, upon introducing the Hate Speech Code, then-EU Commissioner for Justice Vera Jourova said in a public statement:
“If Facebook, YouTube, Twitter and Microsoft want to convince me and the ministers that the non-legislative approach can work, they will have to act quickly and make a strong effort in the coming months.”
The message was unmistakable: Cooperate voluntarily, or we’ll make it law. And that’s exactly what they did—the DSA made it law.
Internal documents before the Committee confirm: The platforms knew this was not a real choice.
An internal email from Google employees dated June 22, 2023:
When the EU Commission proposed a new Disinformation Code Subgroup on Generative AI, a Google employee wrote to colleagues:
“We don’t really have a choice.”
Another Google employee explained how these “voluntary” groups actually function:
“The agenda is set under (strong) impetus from the EU Commission, and so-called ‘consensus’ is achieved under heavy pressure from the European Commission if they disagree.”
In other words: The EU Commission sets the agenda. The EU Commission forces “consensus” through pressure. “Voluntary” is a euphemism for extortion.
3. Over 100 Secret Meetings – Continuous Pressure
Since 2020, the EU Commission has held more than 100 closed meetings with social media platforms. These meetings took place within various “task forces” and “working groups”:
- EU Internet Forum (since 2015)—originally against terrorism, now for “borderline content” like “populist rhetoric”
- Code of Conduct on Hate Speech Working Groups—regular meetings on “hate speech” definition
- Code of Practice on Disinformation Task Force with six subgroups:
- Crisis Response Subgroup
- Elections Subgroup
- Fact-Checking Subgroup
- Demonetization Subgroup
- Transparency Subgroup
- Empowerment Subgroup
- DSA Election Roundtables—before every major election
- DSA Workshops—closed “best practice” trainings
In these meetings, a question was regularly asked that is documented in dozens of meeting agendas:
“What policy changes have you made?”
Or:
“What new measures/policy adjustments regarding disinformation have you implemented?”
The message was clear: We want you to change your rules. We want you to censor more. Show us what you’ve done.
An example: The Crisis Response Subgroup met over a dozen times between 2022 and 2024. The characteristic agenda (December 2023) asked:
“New developments and actions related to fighting disinformation, specifically referencing policy changes.”
The platforms knew: The DSA is coming. Those who don’t proactively censor will later be hit with billion-dollar penalties. So they changed their rules—preemptively, globally, comprehensively.
The Actors – Who Censors Whom?
The system doesn’t function automatically. It is operated by people. People with names, titles, and documented responsibility.
EU Commission Leadership
Ursula von der Leyen – President of the European Commission:
Von der Leyen personally approved the COVID-19 censorship campaign. In June 2020, she launched the “COVID-19 Disinformation Monitoring Program,” which forced platforms to regularly report what they had deleted and throttled.
In October 2020, she personally approved—as documented in internal emails—the request to platforms asking how they would change their content moderation for COVID vaccines. This happened months before even a single person was vaccinated.
Von der Leyen is the chief architect of the “Democracy Shield,” the next major expansion of the system, announced in November 2025.
Vera Jourova – Vice President for Values and Transparency:
Jourova personally conducted dozens of meetings with CEOs and senior managers of TikTok, Meta, Google, and other platforms.
In a meeting in February 2021 with Facebook, Google, TikTok, Twitter, and YouTube, Jourova explicitly asked what platforms could do to have “less toxic content”—not illegal content, but “toxic” content according to her subjective definition.
In May 2024—months before the US presidential election—Jourova traveled to California to meet with TikTok CEO Shou Chew. Internal TikTok emails show: TikTok asked whether the meeting would remain “mostly EU focused” or whether Jourova also wanted to discuss “US election preparations.”
The EU Commission responded: “Both.”
The EU Commission discussed how TikTok should moderate the 2024 US presidential election.
Thierry Breton – Former Commissioner for Internal Market:
Breton is notorious for his threatening letter to Elon Musk dated August 12, 2024. One day before Musk’s live interview with Donald Trump on X, Breton wrote:
“We will not hesitate to make full use of our toolbox.”
The threat was clear: If X doesn’t “appropriately” moderate the Trump interview, we will use the DSA against you.
The US House of Representatives subsequently sent two letters of protest. Breton had to resign in September 2024.
Prabhat Agarwal – Head of DSA Enforcement:
Agarwal is the top career official enforcing the DSA. At a public event in March 2024 (documented in an internal Google readout), Agarwal stated bluntly:
The voluntary codes—Hate Speech Code and Disinformation Code—had been designed to exert “reputational damage” on platforms that didn’t censor enough.
Now, with the DSA, the Commission has something better: “The law.”
Binding censorship orders, enforceable with billion-dollar penalties.
Renate Nikolay – Deputy Director-General, DG-Connect:
Nikolay is the second-highest official in the Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology—the department implementing the DSA.
At the same event in March 2024, Nikolay said the EU now has “control of recommender systems”—control over the algorithms that determine what users see.
She added: This is “not enough.” They must “go further.”
This is not conspiracy theory. This is a direct quote from a high-ranking EU official, documented in an internal Google memo.
VI. The NGO Network – Censorship Outsourcing as System
The EU doesn’t censor directly. It outsources censorship to a massive network of so-called “Civil Society Organizations.” This allows it to claim there is no state censorship—while the state pays the censors.
Trusted Flaggers – Quasi-State Censorship Authority
The DSA creates a new category of actors: Trusted Flaggers.
DSA Article 22 defines them as organizations with “particular expertise” in detecting illegal content. These organizations receive special rights:
“Providers of online platforms shall take the necessary technical and organisational measures to ensure that notices submitted by trusted flaggers… are given priority and are processed and decided upon without undue delay.”
This means concretely:
Normal users report content:
- Platform reviews eventually
- No guarantee of processing
- No privileged access
- Can take weeks
Trusted Flagger reports content:
- Platform MUST process with priority
- Platform MUST decide “without undue delay”
- Direct line to platform moderators
- De facto: Immediate censorship order
Trusted Flagger status is granted by “Digital Services Coordinators”—national government agencies that must be appointed by each EU state.
The official requirements for Trusted Flagger status:
- “Particular expertise and competence” in detecting illegal content
- “Independence from any provider of online platforms”
- “Diligence, accuracy, and objectivity”
The reality: Almost all Trusted Flaggers are NGOs financed either directly by governments or by the EU.
Examples of designated Trusted Flaggers:
Germany:
- HateAid – NGO specializing in “hate online,” regularly defines conservative positions as “hate”
- Bundesverband der Verbraucherzentralen – state-funded
Romania:
- Elie Wiesel Institute for Holocaust Remembrance – state institution
- Save the Children Romania
Ireland:
- Central Bank of Ireland – a government agency!
The last example is particularly absurd: A government agency is designated as “Trusted Flagger.” The claim of “independence” is laughable.
European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) – The Control Center
EDMO is the heart of the NGO network. It is an EU-funded consortium that:
- Coordinates fact-checkers in all 27 EU states
- Provides “monitoring and analytical capabilities” for the EU Commission
- Creates “situational awareness” during elections and “crises”
- Works directly with the EU Commission
Funding: Horizon Europe Programme—the same “civilian research funds” that also flow massively to Israel and are converted there into military dual-use technology.
(See article “HORIZON EUROPE” on my site).
EDMO has national “hubs” in every EU state. These hubs coordinate local fact-checkers, organize “Election Task Forces,” and report to the EU Commission.
Romania as example:
EDMO Romania coordinated four fact-checkers:
- Funky Citizens (via division “Factual”)
- AFP Verificat (part of AFP Fact-Check)
- Freedom House Romania
- Eurocomunicare
These organizations were all active in the 2024 Romania election. They all reported “disinformation” related to Georgescu. They were all paid by the EU and/or by Meta/Google.
Fact-Checkers – Paid by Those They’re Supposed to Monitor
Here the system becomes absurd—and criminal.
Fact-checkers are supposedly “independent.” The DSA explicitly requires that Trusted Flaggers must be “independent from any provider of online platforms.”
In reality, fact-checkers are directly paid by the platforms they monitor:
Meta has contracts with over 80 fact-checking organizations worldwide, including in every EU state. These organizations are paid to mark content on Facebook and Instagram as “false information,” “partly false,” “missing context,” or “misleading.”
Google finances fact-checkers through the “Google News Initiative” with millions.
TikTok works with fact-checkers like Lead Stories (a US firm), also in Europe.
The fundamental problem: Payment is based on quantity. Fact-checkers are paid for how many “fact-checks” they produce. More fact-checks = more money.
The incentive: Mark as much as possible as “false” or “misleading.”
A concrete example from Romania:
Funky Citizens is a fact-checker under Meta contract. An investigative analysis by “Francezul” (an independent Romanian journalist) showed:
Funky Citizens marked an ironic, hyperbolic statement by an influencer on Facebook as “disinformation.” The influencer had jokingly exaggerated that a new law would “criminalize all voters of right-wing parties.”
Obviously, this was rhetorical exaggeration, not a factual claim.
Funky Citizens treated it as a factual claim, “refuted” it, and marked the post as disinformation.
Even worse: Funky Citizens was simultaneously:
- Content Creator – produces own political content
- Fact-Checker – reviews others’ content
- Trusted Flagger – reports content for deletion in “Rapid Response System”
This is like a soccer player who is simultaneously referee and linesman.
The Financing – Follow the Money
Germany – the center of the system:
Germany spends €1.5 billion per year on the NGO censorship complex.
Funding sources:
- Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung – hundreds of millions for “democracy promotion”
- Federal Ministry for Family Affairs – program “Demokratie leben!” with over €200 million annually
- Federal Ministry of the Interior – programs against “extremism”
- State governments – own programs
EU level:
Estimated €3-5 billion per year EU-wide.
Funding sources:
- Horizon Europe – “research program” (EDMO is funded through this)
- Digital Europe Programme – digital infrastructure
- Creative Europe – media and culture
- Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values Programme – “civil society support”
- Democracy Shield – additional €3.6 billion announced (tripling the budget!)
Plus: Direct payments from platforms:
- Meta pays dozens of millions to fact-checkers worldwide
- Google likewise
- TikTok likewise
Plus: Private foundations:
- Open Society Foundations (George Soros) – finances NGOs like Access Now, Freedom House
- Omidyar Network – finances “democracy” NGOs
- Various “democracy foundations”
The Scaling – 330+ Organizations and Growing
According to the Liber-Net study by Andrew Lowenthal, over 330 actors—directly or indirectly state-funded—are actively engaged in content moderation in the EU.
This number is from 2025. With Democracy Shield, it will be massively expanded:
- European Network of Fact-Checkers – fact-checking in all 24 EU languages, hundreds of new fact-checkers
- European Centre for Democratic Resilience – central coordination of all NGOs
- €3.6 billion additional budget – tripling of NGO financing
The scaling is already underway. The system is growing exponentially.
The Perversion – Citizens Pay for Their Own Enslavement
The system works like this:
- Citizens pay taxes
- Governments finance NGOs
- NGOs censor citizens
- Government claims: “No state censorship, these are private actors”
- Citizens pay again (platforms pass costs to advertisers, advertisers to consumers)
Citizens pay twice to be lied to and censored:
- Once through taxes (€3-5 billion EU-wide)
- Once through consumption (advertising costs are passed on)
And then they’re told this serves their “protection” and “democracy.”
This is industrialized gaslighting on a societal level.
IX. The Evidence – Why This Is Court-Proof
These are not speculations. These are not “leaks” of unknown origin. These are not anonymous sources.
These are official documents, compelled by Congressional Subpoenas, verifiable, traceable, court-proof.
The Documentation
Internal emails with complete metadata:
- Sender, recipient, CC, BCC
- Timestamp (to the second)
- Subject lines
- Attachments
- Traceable communication chains (who replied to whom, when)
Meeting protocols and agendas:
- Participant lists with names and titles
- Agenda items
- Discussion summaries
- Decisions
- Follow-up measures
Policy documents with version control:
- Track Changes show exactly WHAT was changed
- Timestamps show WHEN it was changed
- Comments show WHY it was changed
- Author information shows WHO changed it
Presentations and internal memos:
- PowerPoint presentations for internal strategy meetings
- Memos between departments
- “Read-outs” from meetings with EU Commission
Sworn testimony:
- Managers from Meta, Google, TikTok, X, others under oath before the Committee
- Punishable by up to five years in prison for false testimony
- Cross-verified with documents
Concrete Examples with Direct Quotes
TikTok Community Guidelines Change (March 2024):
An internal TikTok document titled “TikTok Community Guidelines Update Executive Summary” dated March 20, 2024, states verbatim:
“As advised by the legal team, the updates were mainly related to compliance with the Digital Services Act (DSA).”
The document then lists the new censorship categories:
- “Marginalizing speech”
- “Coded statements that normalize inequitable treatment”
- “Misinformation that undermines public trust”
- “Media presented out of context”
- “Misrepresented authoritative information”
These categories are all extremely subjective. And they apply worldwide, not just in the EU.
Google internal (June 2023):
An internal email between Google employees dated June 22, 2023, discussing a new Disinformation Code Subgroup:
“We don’t really have a choice.”
Another employee in the same email thread:
“The agenda is set under (strong) impetus from the EU Commission, and so-called ‘consensus’ is achieved under heavy pressure from the European Commission if they disagree.”
EU Commission to TikTok (November 2020):
Email dated November 6, 2020, meeting readout between TikTok and staff of Vice President Jourova:
“Vaccines will be our new focus on disinformation on covid.”
This was months before the first person was vaccinated.
EU Commission to TikTok (October 2020):
Email dated October 30, 2020, EU Commission to TikTok:
“How do you plan to update your terms of service or content moderation practices (promotion / demotion) ahead of the rollout of COVID-19 vaccines?”
This request was made “with the knowledge of” President von der Leyen and “the agreement of” Vice President Jourova.
TikTok Response (November 2020):
TikTok document “Input to European Commission Request on Covid-19 Vaccination Disinformation” dated November 4, 2020:
“Monitoring satire related to vaccinations.”
They censored satire about not-yet-existent vaccinations!
TikTok to EU about Romania (December 2024):
Official TikTok “Response to Commission RFI” dated December 7, 2024:
“TikTok has not found, nor been presented with, any evidence of a coordinated network of 25,000 accounts associated with Mr. Georgescu’s campaign.”
This is the core claim of Romanian intelligence services. TikTok found no evidence.
Nikolay at public event (March 2024):
Internal Google memo, readout of event “Protecting The 2024 Elections: From Alarm to Action” dated March 8, 2024:
Renate Nikolay (Deputy Director-General, DG-Connect):
“We have control of recommender systems… [but that’s] not enough… we need to go further.”
Agarwal at the same event:
Prabhat Agarwal (Head of DSA Enforcement):
The codes (Hate Speech and Disinformation) had been designed to cause “reputational damage on platforms.”
Now, with the DSA, the Commission has something better: “The law.”
Each of these quotes is supported by original documents. With date. With context. With traceable origin.
Summary:
You now understand the system:
- The legal tools (DSA, “voluntary” codes)
- The actors (von der Leyen, Jourova, Breton, Agarwal, Nikolay)
- The NGO network (330+ organizations, €3-5 billion/year)
- The evidence (tens of thousands of internal documents)
The system exists. It is operational. It censors daily.
Preview Part 2:
What Was Concretely Done?
- Romania: How an election was annulled based on lies
- Seven other elections: Concrete interference in Slovakia, France, Ireland, more
- COVID censorship: Which true information was deleted
- US censorship: How the EU censored American citizens
- Democracy Shield: What’s coming next—user verification, end of anonymity
- The consequences: What must happen legally
Part 2:
The Crimes. The Evidence. The Consequences.
After that, six deep-dive analyses on:
- Democracy Shield (the endgame system)
- TikTok/Meta policy changes (what exactly is censored)
- Breton-Musk showdown & X penalty (political retaliation)
- Stanford & US connection (global coordination)
- Germany’s special role (€1.5 bn/year censorship budget)
- Algorithm control (manipulating what people see)
The truth is coming to light.
Michael Hollister is a geopolitical analyst and investigative journalist. He served six years in the German military, including peacekeeping deployments in the Balkans (SFOR, KFOR), followed by 14 years in IT security management. His analysis draws on primary sources to examine European militarization, Western intervention policy, and shifting power dynamics across Asia. A particular focus of his work lies in Southeast Asia, where he investigates strategic dependencies, spheres of influence, and security architectures. Hollister combines operational insider perspective with uncompromising systemic critique—beyond opinion journalism. His work appears on his bilingual website (German/English) www.michael-hollister.com, at Substack at https://michaelhollister.substack.com and in investigative outlets across the German-speaking world and the Anglosphere.
This analysis is made available for free – but high-quality research takes time, money, energy, and focus. If you’d like to support this work, you can do so here:

Alternatively, support my work with a Substack subscription – from as little as 5 USD/month or 40 UDS/year!
Let’s build a counter-public together.
SOURCES
Primary Source – US House Judiciary Committee Report:
“The Foreign Censorship Threat, Part II: Europe’s Decade-Long Campaign to Censor the Global Internet and How it Harms American Speech in the United States”
Main Report (PDF, 160 pages): https://judiciary.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/republicans-judiciary.house.gov/files/2026-02/THE-FOREIGN-CENSORSHIP-THREAT-PART-II-2-3-26.pdf
Official Press Release (February 3, 2026): https://judiciary.house.gov/media/press-releases/new-report-exposes-european-commission-decade-long-campaign-censor-american
Hearing Announcement (February 4, 2026): https://judiciary.house.gov/committee-activity/hearings/europes-threat-american-speech-and-innovation-part-ii
EU Sources:
Digital Services Act – Official Legal Text (EU-Lex): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022R2065
EU Digital Strategy – DSA Overview Page: https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/digital-services-act-package
Media Reports on the Report:
Daily Caller (Feb 3, 2026): “House Judiciary Drops ‘EU Censorship Files'” https://dailycaller.com/2026/02/03/house-judiciary-drops-eu-censorship-files-exposing-massive-effort-to-silence-american-speech/
EUobserver (Feb 4, 2026): “US Republicans accuse the EU of ‘decade-long censorship campaign'” https://euobserver.com/201378/us-republicans-accuse-the-eu-of-decade-long-censorship-campaign/
Brussels Signal (Feb 4, 2026): “EC interfered in elections across Europe and censors content” https://brusselssignal.eu/2026/02/ec-interfered-in-elections-across-europe-and-censors-content-us-republicans-say/
HotAir (Feb 4, 2026): “House Judiciary Committee Outlines 10-Year EU Campaign to Silence Americans” https://hotair.com/david-strom/2026/02/04/house-judiciary-committee-outlines-10-year-eu-campaign-to-silence-americans-n3811503
© Michael Hollister — All rights reserved. Redistribution, publication or reuse of this text requires express written permission from the author. For licensing inquiries, please contact the author via www.michael-hollister.com.
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