The US-War on Drugs

When the CIA Cries “Stop Thief”

by Michael Hollister
Published at GlobalBridge on January 25, 2026

3.180 words * 17 minutes readingtime

The Timeline “CIA & Drug Trafficking” you will find here:
CIA & Drug Trafficking – A Timeline of Covert Entanglements (1960-2026)

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Introduction: The Myth of the Narco-State – When Reality Doesn’t Fit the Narrative

It’s the old story in new packaging: The United States wages war – against drugs, against terror, against chaos on its own doorstep. This time, Venezuela is in the crosshairs. Under President Donald Trump, the US government launched a series of spectacular measures in 2025: airstrikes on alleged drug boats, the designation of the South American country as a “narco-terrorist state,” the kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro by US special forces – and most recently, international rhetoric declaring Venezuela the new scapegoat for the global drug problem.

Trump personally announced that he would “win the war on drugs by any means necessary.” The rhetoric is martial, the imagery powerful, the goal clear: the alleged infiltration of the Western world by drug networks from Latin America. Venezuela is portrayed as the hub of state-protected cocaine trafficking, President Maduro as a drug lord in the presidential palace. The official narrative: Only a decisive strike against this “narco-state” can save America – and the world – from a tsunami of drugs.

But anyone who takes the trouble to examine the foundations of this claim encounters a remarkable gap: In the three most important international drug reports – the World Drug Report of the UNODC, the annual report of the INCB, and the Cocaine Trend Analyses of the EU Drug Monitoring Centre – Venezuela plays virtually no role. Neither as a source country nor as a transit country nor as a destination country. Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, even West Africa – all these regions feature prominently in the data. Venezuela? A footnote. No chapter. No focal point. No evidence for the central role Washington claims.

That alone raises questions. It becomes even more serious when you know the context: The biggest drug problem in the US is currently fentanyl, not cocaine – and Venezuela is neither a production country nor a hub for this synthetic opioid. The central drug responsible for tens of thousands of American deaths each year according to the CDC comes mainly from Mexico and China – not from Caracas.

So why this focus? Why this harshness – up to and including targeted killings on the high seas? Why this propagandistic escalation?

This article doesn’t claim to provide definitive answers. But it aims to do something else: expose the contrast between official rhetoric and known facts. It aims to show how historical patterns – from Vietnam through Afghanistan to today – recur in striking ways. And it aims to encourage readers to form their own opinion. Because as my grandmother always said:

“There are always two reasons – the one they tell you, and the real one.”

2. The Official Narrative: War on Drugs and “Narco-Terrorism”

Since the beginning of his second term, Donald Trump has staged the fight against drugs as a security policy necessity of the highest order. “Narco-states,” “narco-terrorist networks,” “existential threat” – drug trafficking is no longer portrayed as a criminal but as a warfare phenomenon that legitimizes military responses.

At the center stands the term narco-terrorism: an alleged merger of drug cartels, terrorist organizations, and state structures. Venezuela becomes the prime example: hub of cocaine trafficking, protected by military and intelligence services. Maduro is called a “drug lord with state backing,” a $50 million bounty posted. This is no longer about diplomacy but about manhunting.

The conclusion: If a state itself becomes a cartel, conventional rules no longer apply. Military operations, targeted killings, CIA operations, the kidnapping of a president – all of this appears not as escalation but as necessary self-defense. Washington emphasizes it acts not politically but technocratically and morally without alternative.

This line of argument has tradition. Since the 1970s, the “War on Drugs” has served as justification for measures otherwise difficult to communicate: military presence abroad, intelligence interventions, restrictions on legal standards. What is new is the radicalism with which this narrative is presented today – and the speed with which accusations turn into acts of violence.

A narrative with such consequences would need to be based on reliable facts. Whether that is the case is examined in the next chapter.

3. What the Facts Actually Show

3.1 Venezuela in International Drug Reports

The official US narrative paints Venezuela as a central drug supplier. International drug report data shows a decidedly different picture.

According to analyses by data teams evaluating UN and DEA data, Venezuela is not a main supplier of cocaine or fentanyl to the US. The deadly fentanyl crisis stems mainly from Mexican smuggling networks obtaining precursor substances from China. For cocaine, the pattern differs as well: Main growing countries are Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia; most shipments pass through Mexico and Central America, not Venezuelan sea routes.

A report citing 2019-2023 UN data shows: Venezuela had around 260 cocaine processing facilities – Colombia over 26,000. The routes identified as direct suppliers to the US largely bypass Venezuelan participation.

In short: Washington’s official picture is not supported by international drug data. Venezuela plays a subordinate role compared to established routes – and the fentanyl crisis is not connected to Venezuela.

3.2 Political Instrumentalization

If the data is so clear, why this hard line? Critical observers see political instrumentalization. Venezuela focus reflects less documented drug flows than strategic interests: pressure on political opponents, justification for military presence, domestic demonstration of strength.

Trump defended airstrikes on smuggling boats without clear evidence connecting them to fentanyl import. Dramatic language – “narco-terrorist state,” “drug baron in presidential palace” – shifts international law boundaries and gets emphasized in election years without broad data basis.

4. Historical Contexts: US Intelligence Services, Drugs, and Geopolitical Interests

Today’s officially propagated “war on drug trafficking” narrative is not historically singular. For decades, patterns emerged intertwining political power, strategic interests, and illegal drug economies in asymmetric conflicts. Three particularly revealing fields: the Vietnam context in the Golden Triangle, Afghanistan 2001-2021, and the Iran-Contra affair in Central America.

4.1 The “Golden Triangle”: Air America and Covert CIA Logistics

Historian Alfred W. McCoy documents in The Politics of Heroin (1972, updated 2003) how the CIA during the Indochina War deliberately cooperated with local warlords – though they were deeply involved in opium trade.

The CIA operated in the 1960s and early 1970s under Air America cover, an officially civilian airline, air transport to remote Laos areas. According to McCoy, weapons were delivered for anti-communist militias – and in return, raw opium was flown out from Hmong growing areas, later processed into heroin in Saigon laboratories.

“CIA contract aircraft flew opium out of the Hmong hills in Laos, while providing weapons and supplies to the tribal armies that protected the poppy fields.”
(McCoy, A. W., The Politics of Heroin, 2003, p. 163)

The CIA officially denied involvement, but McCoy proved through internal reports and witness statements that Air America became part of the drug export transport network. In Long Tieng, General Vang Pao established an extensive, militia-based opium system with American backing.

“By 1971, Southeast Asia supplied 70 percent of the world’s illicit heroin.”
(ibid., p. 186)

4.2 Afghanistan 2001-2021: Opium Boom Under US Occupation

Afghanistan is perhaps the most dramatic case in this timeline – and simultaneously the best documented. The numbers speak a clear language that makes a mockery of any official “War on Drugs” justification.

Opium Production Afghanistan (2000-2023)

Year	Regime	Opium Production	Source (UNODC)
2000	Taliban (pre-ban)	~3,276 tons	Afghanistan Opium Survey 2001
2001	Taliban (ban)	~185 tons	Afghanistan Opium Survey 2001
2010	US/NATO	~3,600 tons	Afghanistan Opium Survey 2010
2017	US/NATO	~9,000 tons	Afghanistan Opium Survey 2017
2021	US withdrawal, Taliban return	~6,200 tons	Afghanistan Opium Survey 2022
2023	Taliban (renewed ban)	~330 tons	Afghanistan Opium Survey 2023

UNODC 2023 Report – Original Quote:

“Opium cultivation in Afghanistan has collapsed following a drug ban imposed by the de facto authorities: from 233,000 hectares in 2022 to 10,800 hectares in 2023 – a drop of 95 per cent. The expected amount of opium harvested fell by 95 per cent – from 6,200 tons to 333 tons.”

— UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey 2023, Executive Summary

The data shows a clear pattern: Under strong, authoritarian Taliban prohibition strategy, opium cultivation fell dramatically – both 2000-2001 and 2021-2023 by over 90% each time. Under long-term Western military presence, production rose from ~185 tons (2001) to up to ~9,000 tons (2017) – an increase of over 4,700%.

This is not an isolated detail but an empirical finding interpreted in many analyses as indication that war and instability themselves create fertile ground for drug economies – regardless of whether a narrative of drug combat is proclaimed.

4.3 Iran-Contra & Central America: Drug Trafficking and Covert Financing

Another historically relevant example is the Iran-Contra affair of the 1980s:

In the Reagan era, the US government supported anti-communist Contra rebels in Nicaragua – though Congress prohibited this by law. Journalist Gary Webb documented in his “Dark Alliance” series that Contra-connected drug traffickers smuggled cocaine into US cities. Official investigations confirmed that CIA employees knew about these activities without intervening.

Drug trafficking did not serve primarily as an independent government business model but as a financing source and logistical element in a covert geopolitical conflict field. This pattern – strategic interests before drug combat – repeats itself in various contexts.

Interim Conclusion:

Historical analysis shows: The relationship between state power, intelligence interests, and international drug trafficking is more complex than most narratives assume. Where legitimate drug combat occurs, it can lead to drastic reductions (e.g., under Taliban bans) – or it is accompanied by paradoxical results when political instability, war, and divergent interests dominate.

These historical patterns – CIA tolerance in the Golden Triangle, massive opium boom under US involvement in Afghanistan, political tolerance of drug networks in the Iran-Contra context – form the background noise for today’s official “War on Drugs” narrative.

5. Strategic Interests Behind the “War on Drugs”

The war on drugs was from the beginning more than just an attempt to crush criminal networks. It was – and remains today – a political tool. Its language sounds moral, its images are drastic, its stated goal allegedly noble. But beneath the surface reveals an instrumentarium enabling political legitimation, military presence, and geopolitical pursuit – often independent of actual threat levels.

5.1 Political Legitimation: From Nixon to Trump

The term “War on Drugs” goes back to 1971, when US President Richard Nixon declared the fight against drugs “public enemy number one.” What began as domestic policy measure quickly developed into a foreign policy lever. Drugs became the symbol of moral decay imported from outside – and thus an enemy image justifying military and intelligence responses.

Since then, US administrations have used the drug war to legitimize measures otherwise barely enforceable: arms deliveries to questionable regimes, cooperation with authoritarian security services, covert operations, extralegal killings.

Under Donald Trump, this moral-political rhetoric experienced a renaissance. Drug cartels were portrayed as terrorist networks, states like Venezuela as hostile systems. In this logic, Maduro’s kidnapping was not an international law violation but necessary execution of justice.

5.2 Military Power Projection and Geopolitical Goals

The drug war served as entry ticket for military presence in geopolitically interesting regions. Hardly any region was militarily surveilled as consistently in the last fifty years as those Washington declared “main sources of the drug problem”:

• Operation Just Cause (1989): Panama invasion to depose Manuel Noriega – officially for drug trafficking, unofficially for Panama Canal control.
• Plan Colombia (1999 ff.): Military and economic aid worth billions, justified by cocaine combat – used for counterinsurgency and geopolitical securing.
• Operation Southern Spear (2025): The latest US Marine campaign in the Caribbean against alleged drug boats, accompanied by targeted killings and a head of state’s kidnapping.

In all these cases, drug rhetoric was not the goal but the vehicle for military action and influence expansion.

Particularly clear in Venezuela’s case: The country is economically supported by China and Russia, politically disobedient, and geostrategically relevant (Caribbean access, oil, symbolic meaning in Latin America). Styling it as “narco-state” enables measures otherwise only conceivable in case of open war declarations: targeted killings, sanctions, diplomatic isolation, military threat scenarios – and ultimately forcible removal of the head of state.

This strategy has the advantage of sounding moral outwardly but working geostrategically inwardly. Those arguing against risk being labeled “drug apologists.” This is precisely why the drug narrative is so effective: It replaces engagement with reality through moral certainty.

Conclusion: The “War on Drugs” is long past being a technocratic fight against a real problem; instead, it’s a strategically deployable tool allowing governments to take measures that under other circumstances would be neither enforceable nor internationally defensible. The language of drug combat becomes masking for geopolitical interests, legitimation of violence, and entry code for military control.

6. Hypotheses – Possible Dark Mechanisms Behind the Drug War Narrative

6.1 Narrative vs. Reality – Why Does the US Narrative Against Venezuela Persist?

If raw data shows no significant connection between Venezuela and major hard drug routes – why is a completely different picture conveyed publicly? Why do US agencies stage Venezuela precisely as hub of a fentanyl problem that factually hardly originates there?

Hypothesis: Communication follows not empirical situation but political strategy. Drug rhetoric serves as projection screen – a means for opinion manipulation, not enlightenment. It’s not about drug trade reality but designing an enemy image flexibly adapted to political goals.

Such procedure is strategically extremely effective: Those opposing military measures or sanctions risk being portrayed as “narco defenders.” This narrative’s moral coding makes contradiction politically risky – even for neutral third parties.

6.2 Intelligence Financing – The Dark Backside of the Drug War

An often discussed but hard-to-prove mechanism is possible use of international drug trafficking for intelligence financing of black operations. Already during Iran-Contra, it came to light that US agencies with CIA knowledge organized weapons deliveries – partly financed through drug money. This practice was never comprehensively investigated.

Hypothesis: The War on Drugs could fulfill a double function: publicly as moral crusade, covertly as cover for intelligence operations. Especially in countries with weak institutions, revenue sources can be created subject to no parliamentary control.

Afghanistan provides another example: After the 2001 US invasion, US-aligned warlords controlled wide parts of opium trade. Were exploding production numbers during NATO occupation really just collateral damage – or part of tacit strategy where local allies got financed through drug revenues?

Historical evidence is fragmentary but clearly suggestive: From Southeast Asia (Golden Triangle) through Afghanistan (opium economy under US occupation) to Latin America, patterns emerge raising questions hardly independently investigated.

6.3 Pattern Analysis – Why This Narrative Repeatedly?

A look at history shows the “War on Drugs” narrative has been used since the 1970s with nearly identical mechanisms – independent of whether target states are actually main producers or transit countries.

Example target states:

• 1970s-1980s: Panama, Colombia, Nicaragua
• 1990s-2000s: Mexico, Bolivia, Afghanistan
• from 2020: Venezuela

Hypothesis: The War on Drugs functions as universally deployable tool for political stigmatization. It allows legitimizing espionage activities, military operations, sanction packages, economic isolation, diplomatic exclusion.

Not a country’s actual role in drug trade is decisive but its geopolitical position. Once a country “steps out of line,” international pressure can be built through the drug narrative – independent of whether facts justify this.

7. Outlook and Open Questions

The official US rhetoric in the fight against drugs – from Nixon through Bush to Trump – always pursued one goal: morally charging state action, legitimizing foreign policy decisions, and fostering domestic mobilization.

Three central questions remain open:

First: Which interests are actually pursued? The increasing militarization of anti-drug policy – including foreign operations in Latin America and Africa – suggests foreign policy power projection, not security.

Second: Why are drug wars expanded although UN, WHO, or DEA data shows they effectively reduce neither consumption nor trade? Why do we experience in 2026 a return to such aggressive rhetoric, although US cities have long gone their own ways in dealing with drugs?

Third: Which data is missing – and why? How many civilian casualties did the War on Drugs claim worldwide? Which connections exist between drug routes and geopolitical conflict zones? What role do banks, intelligence services, or private sector actors play? Why have many of these questions remained unanswered for decades?

These gaps mark the boundary between democratic control and geopolitical utilization. This creates a clear mandate for investigative journalism: No longer just reporting what is said – but systematically investigating what must not be said.

8. Conclusion: The Thief Cries “Stop Thief”

The “War on Drugs” was never just a war against substances. It was always also a narrative war – a struggle for interpretive authority, moral superiority, and geopolitical spheres of influence. For decades, a story was told that simultaneously defined culprits, justified interventions, and delegitimized criticism.

But those examining the patterns recognize a disturbing picture: The loudest shouters against drug trafficking often sit at the levers of power that tolerate, use, or in individual cases even covertly co-steer its structures. The CIA’s role in the 1980s, the silent tolerance of cartel money in the banking sector, the double game in Afghanistan – all this shows: It’s not about zero tolerance. It’s about control.

When Donald Trump in 2026 again appears with hard anti-drug rhetoric – while his foreign policy strategies are conspicuously intertwined with resource and migration issues in Latin America – then a pattern repeats that has nothing to do with facts or genuine problem-solving, but with a geostrategic script long since written.

The conclusion is as simple as it is explosive: The War on Drugs is not a war against drugs. It is a war for narratives, spheres of influence, and economic control. The War on Drugs legitimizes measures that under other circumstances would be considered violations of international law. And while the thief cries “Stop Thief!”, democratic standards are quietly undermined.

This analysis is made available for free – but high-quality research takes time, money, energy, and focus. If you’d like to support this work, you can do so here:

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Michael Hollister is a geopolitical analyst and investigative journalist. He served six years in the German military, including peacekeeping deployments in the Balkans (SFOR, KFOR), followed by 14 years in IT security management. His analysis draws on primary sources to examine European militarization, Western intervention policy, and shifting power dynamics across Asia. A particular focus of his work lies in Southeast Asia, where he investigates strategic dependencies, spheres of influence, and security architectures. Hollister combines operational insider perspective with uncompromising systemic critique—beyond opinion journalism. His work appears on his bilingual website (German/English) www.michael-hollister.com, at Substack at https://michaelhollister.substack.com and in investigative outlets across the German-speaking world and the Anglosphere.

© Michael Hollister — All rights reserved. Redistribution, publication or reuse of this text requires express written permission from the author. For licensing inquiries, please contact the author via www.michael-hollister.com.

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