From RAND Study to National Security Strategy

How Think Tanks Write America’s War Plans

by Michael Hollister
Published at apolut media on January 09, 2026

2.499 words * 13 minutes readingtime

In November 2025, the Trump Administration published its National Security Strategy. Three core statements stand out: The EU is no longer a reliable partner, Russia is no longer the primary enemy, the strategic focus now lies on the Pacific. What appears as a geopolitical pivot is, in truth, the implementation of a detailed war plan that the RAND Corporation already submitted in 2016.

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The National Security Strategy 2025: The Pacific Pivot as Doctrine

The National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States published in November 2025 marks a turning point in American foreign policy—at least on paper. While the Trump Administration effectively declares war on Europe and no longer defines Russia as the primary enemy, Washington now openly concentrates on what internal strategy papers have demanded for years: the containment of China in the Indo-Pacific.

The NSS formulates crystal clear: “The Indo-Pacific is already the source of nearly half of global GDP… To succeed at home, we must succeed in competing there.” It continues: “Deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority.”

Even more explicit, the strategy states on page 24: “We will build a military capable of denying aggression anywhere in the First Island Chain.”

These formulations aren’t new. They’re also not an original Trump doctrine. They are the literal implementation of recommendations that the RAND Corporation—one of the world’s most powerful and influential think tanks—already developed in several studies in 2016 and 2017.

RAND Corporation: The War Planning Center with Academic Veneer

The RAND Corporation isn’t an ordinary think tank. Founded in 1948 as a joint project of the US Air Force and Douglas Aircraft Company, RAND operates with an annual budget exceeding $350 million and employs an army of highly qualified experts: military strategists, physicists, data analysts, economists, and political scientists—many with government or intelligence service experience.

Primary clients include the Pentagon, Homeland Security, various intelligence agencies, and NATO partner states. RAND doesn’t work politically neutral but develops “options, probabilities, risks”—based on simulations, data analysis, and military feasibility assessments. Recommendations from RAND studies aren’t thought models but regularly become the foundation of actual policy.

The organization was instrumental in concepts like deterrence doctrine (Mutual Assured Destruction) and shaped strategic thinking from the Cold War to today. RAND mathematicians like Herman Kahn developed the “Megadeath” calculations—the cynical computation of millions of deaths as a strategic variable.

“War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable” (2016)

In 2016, RAND published a study that marked a turning point: “War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable.” The core message was unambiguous: “China could not win and might lose a severe war with the United States in 2025.”

This formulation is decisive. It implies a closing time window—the further time advances, the smaller the American advantage becomes. The study warned of “conventional countervalue capability”: Both sides increasingly possess the means to strike the other’s forces, creating incentives for preemptive strikes.

The temporal perspective was alarming: “Currently, Chinese losses would far exceed US losses. But by 2025, that gap could be much smaller.”

RAND systematically calculated: costs, escalation dynamics, duration, and forms of warfare—with the result that a long war would be catastrophic for both sides, but especially costly for China. The logic was clear: If the USA wants to act, it must do so soon—from a position of strength, while it still exists.

“Conflict with China Revisited” (2017): The Shrinking Window

The 2017 update sharpened the analysis further: “The range and capabilities of Chinese air and maritime defenses have continued to grow, making US forward bases more vulnerable and the direct defense of US interests in the region potentially more costly.”

Even more explicit regarding the temporal dimension: “The United States should engage constructively with China on a range of potential flashpoints sooner rather than later—before its power position in the region further deteriorates.”

This formulation suggests the USA should act from a position of strength while it still can. The implicit time window? About a decade before China’s military capabilities make direct defense of US interests in the Western Pacific impossible.

RAND systematically analyzed conflict triggers in descending probability:

1. Korea: Regime collapse or escalation with North Korea where China could intervene
2. South China Sea: Clashes over competing territorial claims
3. Taiwan: Blockade or invasion by China provoking US intervention
4. Cyberspace: Offensive operations with escalation potential
5. Japan: Confrontations in the East China Sea

The studies described Taiwan scenarios as the greatest challenge. RAND explicitly recommended in 2017: “Modernizing and expanding the number of Taiwanese anti-ship cruise missiles could make the cost of an amphibious invasion attempt by China prohibitively high.”

This recommendation has been implemented since—Taiwan is massively purchasing mobile anti-ship missiles and asymmetric defense systems.

From Paper to Doctrine: The Direct Correspondence

The correspondences between the RAND studies of 2016/2017 and the National Security Strategy of November 2025 aren’t subtle—they’re verbatim.

RAND 2016/2017: “Deterring a conflict over Taiwan… by preserving military overmatch”

NSS 2025 (Page 23): “Deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority”

RAND 2017: “The United States should build a military capable of denying aggression anywhere in the First Island Chain”

NSS 2025 (Page 24): “We will build a military capable of denying aggression anywhere in the First Island Chain”

RAND 2017: “The United States should move sooner rather than later—before its power position in the region further deteriorates”

NSS 2025 (Page 19): “The Indo-Pacific is already and will continue to be among the next century’s key economic and geopolitical battlegrounds”

These formulations aren’t coincidences. They aren’t content parallels. They’re copies. The National Security Strategy of the United States reads in places like a plagiarism of the RAND studies—or more precisely: like their authorized implementation into official government policy.

The Institutional Interconnections

The connections between RAND and the US government are obvious and systematic:

• RAND receives hundreds of millions of dollars annually from the Pentagon and other defense agencies
• Leadership personnel regularly rotate between RAND, government, and defense industry
• RAND analysts directly brief Congressional committees, NSC staff, and military commanders
• Studies are frequently commissioned by specific government agencies

This isn’t neutral policy advice. This is an institutionalized pipeline from think tank to government policy. RAND formulates strategic options, the Pentagon selects, the government implements.

China’s “Threat”: Where the USA Has Been Overtaken

The RAND studies systematically analyze in which areas China challenges or surpasses the USA:

Economically: The 2017 study projected: “By 2030, China’s gross domestic product could exceed that of the United States.” China is already the largest trading partner for most countries worldwide.

Industrially: China possesses the world’s largest shipyard capacity, leading 5G technology, control over 80% of rare earth production, and growing dominance in artificial intelligence.

Geopolitically: China’s Belt and Road Initiative extends across three continents, a military base in Djibouti expands presence, and growing cooperation with the Global South undermines US influence networks.

Militarily: China has built “Anti-Access/Area-Denial” capabilities (A2AD)—a network of missiles, sensors, and submarines designed to keep US forces away from China’s periphery. RAND noted in 2016: “China has acquired an operational aircraft carrier, announced a second, and plans three to four additional carriers over the next 20 years.”

The NSS 2025: Implementation Is in Full Swing

The National Security Strategy 2025 shows that several RAND strategies are already being implemented:

Military Positioning: “We will harden and strengthen our military presence in the Western Pacific” (NSS p. 24)—reinforcement of US bases in Japan, Philippines, Australia

Taiwan Militarization: Arms sales and high-level visits, exactly as RAND recommended in 2017

Economic Decoupling: “We will rebalance America’s economic relationship with China, prioritizing reciprocity and fairness” (NSS p. 20)

Technology Controls: The NSS explicitly demands “aligning the actions of our allies and partners with our joint interest in preventing domination by any single competitor nation” (NSS p. 21)

AUKUS Pact (2021): Nuclear-powered submarines for Australia—implemented before NSS 2025 but now officially confirmed

Chip Sanctions (2022-2024): Comprehensive export controls for semiconductor technology

Does RAND Recommend Military Action?

The RAND analyses don’t recommend unprovoked aggressive war, but they develop detailed scenarios for “inevitable” conflicts. From the 2017 study:

“As time passes and Chinese capabilities improve, the United States will probably find itself compelled to shift from deterrence by denial to deterrence by punishment, based on the threat of escalation.”

“The most direct military escalation option for the United States—most credible and one-sided in its effects—are conventional precision strikes against Chinese warfighting and war-support targets on the mainland.”

The 2016 study formulated the logic of preventive action: “Technological advances create conditions whereby each side has the means to strike the other’s forces and, therefore, an incentive to do so promptly, if not first.”

This is the language of preemptive warfare, packaged in academic detachment.

Ukraine as Evidence: RAND Recommendations Are Implemented

Ukraine provides empirical proof that RAND strategies aren’t just read but implemented.

The 2019 RAND study “Overextending and Unbalancing Russia” contained remarkable recommendations: “Providing lethal aid to Ukraine would exploit Russia’s greatest external vulnerability.” The authors warned that military support “would need to be carefully calibrated to raise costs for Russia without provoking a much larger conflict.”

The RAND analysis listed as “highly effective”:

• Expansion of US energy production (probability of success: high, costs: low)
• Tightening of trade and financial sanctions (probability of success: high)
• Military support for Ukraine (probability of success: moderate, risk: high)

The reality since 2022: Europe was weaned off Russian gas, the USA became the largest LNG exporter, and Ukraine receives continuously growing military support in the triple-digit billions. The correspondence between RAND recommendations and actual policy is nearly complete.

Now, in the NSS 2025, Russia is no longer defined as the primary enemy. Why? Because the RAND strategy was successful—Russia is “overextended,” the USA can now focus on China.

The Critical Decade: 2025-2035

All examined RAND studies converge on a timeframe: The decade between 2025 and 2035 represents the critical window in which the USA can still claim military superiority in the Western Pacific.

The 2017 analysis formulates urgency multiple times: “We recommend that the United States move sooner rather than later—before its power position in the region further deteriorates.”

This logic creates dangerous incentives: If power relations continuously shift in China’s favor, the temptation could arise to provoke a conflict while the USA is still superior.

At this point, voices within the USA itself become vocal:

• Adm. Phil Davidson (INDOPACOM, 2021): “The threat is manifest during this decade—in the next six years.”
• Gen. Mike Minihan (USAF, 2023 memo): “My gut tells me we will fight in 2025. I hope I am wrong.” (internal command, became public)
• Heritage Foundation: “Still time to regain deterrence by 2027.”

These statements aren’t isolated opinions. They’re part of a strategic consensus within the US security elite that directly rests on RAND analyses.

The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy

The most critical question: Do these analyses serve war avoidance or prepare the ground for an escalation they allegedly want to prevent?

When Chinese strategists read RAND papers that describe in detail how the USA wants to contain China’s rise, this reinforces Beijing’s conviction that conflict is inevitable. This leads to accelerated armament—exactly the scenario RAND warns against.

The 2016 study admits: “Chinese policymakers are one of its intended audiences.”

So RAND knows Beijing is reading. RAND knows Beijing will arm up. RAND knows this increases the probability of war. And RAND publishes anyway.

This isn’t analysis. This is provocation with academic cover.

History Repeats: Iraq, Ukraine, Now China

Analysis of the RAND studies reveals a disturbing pattern:

Iraq: RAND examined in the 1990s the consequences of regime change, drafted scenarios for nation-building, and predicted ethno-sectarian tensions. The US administration used many of these assessments to justify the Iraq War in 2003.

Ukraine: The RAND study “Overextending and Unbalancing Russia” (2019) has been almost completely implemented since 2022.

China: The studies from 2016/2017 are now—in 2025—becoming official doctrine of the United States.

In all three cases, RAND delivered the conceptual foundation. In all three cases, the recommendations became policy. With Iraq, this ended catastrophically. With Ukraine, the outcome is still open. With China, it concerns the future of global order—and potentially a war between nuclear powers.

RAND Doesn’t Just Think Through Scenarios—RAND Prepares Them

The decisive question isn’t whether RAND analyses are technically competent—they undoubtedly are. The question is whether their basic premises—US hegemony as self-evident good, China as existential threat, military superiority as necessary goal—may even be questioned.

RAND isn’t a neutral research institution. RAND is the Pentagon’s planning department with academic veneer. RAND doesn’t develop “options”—RAND develops war plans that are then presented by the government as “without alternative.”

The National Security Strategy 2025 is the proof. What began in 2016 as an academic thought model is official US doctrine in 2025. The correspondences are too precise to be coincidence. They’re too systematic to be mere inspiration.

The NSS 2025 is RAND in government prose.

Conclusion: The Think Tank-to-Policy Pipeline

What follows isn’t just a test case for the Indo-Pacific but for the question of whether the United States will once again secure its global hegemony through military means if necessary—based on scientific but highly political war games.

Given multiple global crisis points and increasing bloc confrontation, the central question shouldn’t be: “How can the USA preserve its dominance?” But rather: “How can the world’s greatest powers cooperate to ensure humanity’s survival?”

RAND doesn’t ask this question. And that’s precisely what makes the analyses so dangerous.

What’s presented as sober scenario analysis is, in truth, the simulation of escalation—a war in the laboratory that will claim real victims.

The National Security Strategy 2025 shows: The war is no longer theory. It’s doctrine.

RAND delivered the blueprint. Washington is implementing it. The question is no longer whether the USA seeks conflict with China. The question is whether this conflict can still be prevented—or whether RAND logic forces the USA into a war nobody can win.

This analysis is made available for free – but high-quality research takes time, money, energy, and focus. If you’d like to support this work, you can do so here:

Alternatively, support my work with a Substack subscription – from as little as 5 USD/month.
Let’s build a counter-public together.

Michael Hollister is a geopolitical analyst and investigative journalist. He served six years in the German military, including peacekeeping deployments in the Balkans (SFOR, KFOR), followed by 14 years in IT security management. His analysis draws on primary sources to examine European militarization, Western intervention policy, and shifting power dynamics across Asia. A particular focus of his work lies in Southeast Asia, where he investigates strategic dependencies, spheres of influence, and security architectures. Hollister combines operational insider perspective with uncompromising systemic critique—beyond opinion journalism. His work appears on his bilingual website (German/English) www.michael-hollister.com, at Substack at https://michaelhollister.substack.com and in investigative outlets across the German-speaking world and the Anglosphere.

© Michael Hollister— Redistribution, publication or reuse of this text is explicitly welcome. The only requirement is proper source attribution and a link to www.michael-hollister.com (or in printed form the note “Source: www.michael-hollister.com”).

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