Afghanistan: Trump’s Bagram Move and the New Great Game

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Bagram may once again become American. Donald Trump’s announcement to reclaim the airbase north of Kabul, which was hastily abandoned in 2021, could mark the end of a brief geopolitical pause. The Taliban have already rejected the idea—clearly and emphatically. Written off after NATO’s chaotic withdrawal, Afghanistan might once again turn into the flashpoint of global power politics, with devastating consequences for its people and dangerous implications for the entire region.

Those who believe Washington’s motives are about counterterrorism or regional stability underestimate the scale of the game. Afghanistan was never just Afghanistan. It is China’s backyard, Russia’s security belt, Pakistan’s strategic depth, and Iran’s gateway to Central Asia. Whoever controls Bagram sits at the heart of the new Great Game—the same geopolitical chessboard that has been played for two centuries over the heads of the Afghan people.

Bagram: More Than a Base

During the years of U.S. occupation, Bagram Air Base was the logistical backbone of the intervention: drone operations, airstrikes, prisoner facilities, and supply coordination. Its location—just 50 kilometers north of Kabul—made it irreplaceable. From here, the United States could monitor not only Afghanistan but also Central Asia, western China, and northern Pakistan, and, if necessary, strike at will.

The withdrawal in July 2021—quietly, at night, without even informing Afghan allies—became the symbol of defeat. According to media reports, thousands of vehicles, equipment, and an intact infrastructure were left behind, now under Taliban control. Trump’s demand to take Bagram back is therefore more than symbolism. It signals that the United States still views Afghanistan not as a sovereign nation but as a field for its own strategic ambitions.

The Taliban’s reaction left no doubt: any return of U.S. troops would be resisted by all means. Observers warn that a renewed U.S. push could not only destabilize the fragile status quo but also bring China, Russia, and Iran immediately into play. This time, the regional powers are prepared to counter any Western intervention—by arming, financing, and diplomatically backing the opposition.

The Great Game: A History of Intervention

Afghanistan has been a pawn of foreign powers for centuries. The British Empire tried three times in the nineteenth century to subdue the country—and failed each time in blood. The goal was always the same: to secure India, the crown jewel, by controlling Afghanistan as a buffer against an expanding Russian Empire.

The Soviet intervention beginning in 1979 followed the same logic, only reversed. Moscow stepped in to protect a friendly communist government from Islamist uprisings. The Soviets spoke of “internationalist duty” and “allied assistance,” while the West called it “brutal invasion.” Both narratives concealed the real motive: geostrategic control over Central Asia. The decade-long war ended in 1989 with a Soviet withdrawal—economically drained, politically discredited, militarily defeated (BBC 2019). What remained was a devastated country and heavily armed mujahideen groups that the West, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan had funded and equipped for years (Council on Foreign Relations 2019).

After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States took the stage. Officially, it was about dismantling al-Qaeda and removing the Taliban from power. In reality, Afghanistan offered far more: a geostrategic hub in the heart of Asia. From here Washington could pressure Iran, observe China, contain Russia, and secure access to immense mineral wealth—copper, lithium, rare earths. Two decades and more than two trillion dollars later, this intervention also ended in defeat. The Taliban returned to power in 2021 as if the twenty years of Western occupation had never happened.

Actors and Interests

United States: Hegemony and Contradictions

Washington’s Afghanistan policy has always been self-contradictory. On the one hand, it spoke of building a democratic, stable state. On the other, it tolerated massive military operations, drone strikes, and alliances with corrupt warlords that undermined that very stability. The result: a government propped up only by Western weapons and dollars—collapsing within days once those disappeared.

Critics have long argued that the U.S. was never serious about nation-building. The real goals were permanent military presence, resource control, and containment of regional rivals. Supporting evidence is easy to find: minimal investment in civilian infrastructure, tolerance of opium cultivation (which reached record levels under U.S. watch), and the prioritization of bases like Bagram over schools and hospitals.

Trump’s current move fits that pattern. It is not about reconstruction or development aid but about re-establishing military control. Yet this time, the equation may not work out.

China: Economy Over Arms

Beijing follows a radically different strategy. It has never sent troops to Afghanistan but instead relies on economic penetration. Geological surveys estimate Afghanistan’s copper, lithium, and rare-earth reserves to be worth up to one trillion dollars (Reuters 2023)—resources China urgently needs for its high-tech industries and energy transition. Even before the Taliban took power, Beijing had negotiated mining concessions, such as the Mes Aynak copper project. After 2021, these contacts deepened.

China offers the Taliban what the West refuses: gradual recognition, economic cooperation without political conditions, and infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (Al Jazeera 2023). In return, Beijing demands security guarantees—Afghanistan must not become a haven for Uyghur separatists or jihadist groups that could threaten China’s Xinjiang region (Brookings 2022).

This approach is pragmatic and effective. China maintains influence without military vulnerability, buys leverage without occupation, and provides the Taliban a pathway out of isolation—in exchange for strategic concessions.

Russia: Pragmatism and Security Interests

Moscow learned its lesson from the Soviet disaster. Instead of intervening again, Russia now relies on diplomacy and security coordination with the Taliban. Its logic is simple: a stable, Taliban-controlled Afghanistan is preferable to chaos that could export Islamist militancy into Central Asia. Moscow has never formally labeled the Taliban a terrorist organization and regularly hosts Taliban delegations in Moscow (Carnegie Moscow Center 2021).

At the same time, Russia coordinates closely with China and Iran to curb Western influence. The message is clear: Afghanistan lies within Russia’s security sphere, and a U.S. return will not be tolerated. Should Trump actually attempt to retake Bagram, Moscow would likely supply the Taliban with weapons and intelligence—a bitter irony of history, given that in the 1980s it was the United States arming Afghan fighters against Soviet troops.

Pakistan: Strategic Depth and Dangerous Double Game

For Pakistan, Afghanistan is existential. The doctrine of “strategic depth” holds that Islamabad must have a secure fallback zone in the west in case of war with India in the east. The ISI, Pakistan’s intelligence service, played a central role in creating and supporting the Taliban in the 1990s—providing training, safe havens, and logistics (Brookings 2021). After 2001, Pakistan officially joined the U.S. “War on Terror” yet continued to shelter Taliban leaders on its soil (Council on Foreign Relations 2018).

This double game remains perilous. Pakistan is the Taliban government’s main external backer and controls key transit routes, yet Pakistani Taliban groups (TTP) use Afghan territory for staging attacks inside Pakistan. The Taliban also refuse to recognize the disputed Durand Line border. Meanwhile, Islamabad fights to block any Indian foothold in Afghanistan. India’s use of Iran’s Chabahar Port to bypass Pakistani routes is seen in Islamabad as a strategic threat. If the U.S. tried to return via Bagram, Pakistan would likely again play both sides—cooperating publicly while undermining quietly.

India: Soft Power Against Pakistani Hegemony

India has invested billions in Afghanistan—not militarily but through civilian projects. New Delhi built roads, dams, the Afghan parliament building, and continues to send humanitarian aid (BBC 2020; Hindustan Times 2022). The aim: a friendly Kabul that pressures Pakistan from both sides and prevents Afghanistan from becoming a haven for Pakistan-backed militant groups.

The Taliban’s takeover in 2021 dealt that plan a severe blow. Still, India maintains cautious contact and keeps aid flowing—via airlifts and through Iran’s Chabahar Port (The Diplomat 2021). New Delhi cannot afford complete absence from Afghanistan; a Pakistan- and China-dominated Kabul would be a geopolitical nightmare.

Iran: Border State, Protector, Pragmatist

Tehran’s relationship with Afghanistan is among the most complex. Deep cultural and religious ties exist, particularly with the Shia Hazara minority. In the 1980s Iran supported Shia mujahideen against both Soviets and later the Taliban. After 2001, Tehran briefly cooperated with Washington, then distanced itself following Bush’s “Axis of Evil” speech and opened its own channels to Taliban factions (New York Times 2017).

Today, Iran is pragmatic. Its 900-kilometer border is a major opium smuggling route that Tehran combats aggressively (UNODC 2020). Millions of Afghan refugees reside in Iran. The Helmand River is a recurring flashpoint—Iran accuses the Taliban of withholding water needed by its drought-stricken provinces (Al Jazeera 2023).

Economically, the port of Chabahar is Tehran’s ace: it grants India direct access to Afghanistan while bypassing Pakistan. Despite sanctions, Iran exports fuel, power, and food to Afghanistan. Politically, it pursues a dual track—criticizing Taliban excesses while cooperating to block U.S. influence. Should Washington attempt to re-seize Bagram, Iran would counter immediately.

The Opium Economy: Funding War, Controlling Power

No analysis of Afghanistan is complete without its drug economy. For decades the country has produced up to 90 percent of the world’s opium (UNODC 2020). During the Soviet war, warlords and mujahideen financed themselves through poppy cultivation; narcotics became an inseparable pillar of the Afghan economy.

A dramatic break occurred in 2000, when the Taliban banned poppy farming. Output collapsed to near zero within months—an unprecedented event in global drug economics (BBC 2001). Motives remain debated: religious edict, bargaining chip for recognition, or price-manipulation strategy. After the 2001 U.S. invasion, production exploded again. Between 2002 and 2017 it hit historic highs—over 8 000 tons a year (UNODC 2017).

During NATO’s presence, cultivation was officially condemned yet widely tolerated. Western “alternative livelihood” programs failed, while corrupt Afghan officials and local powerbrokers profited (SIGAR 2018). No direct evidence links U.S. forces to trafficking, but tacit tolerance fueled the Taliban’s war chest (Al Jazeera 2019)—one of the many contradictions of the occupation.

After returning to power, the Taliban in 2022 announced another opium ban. UN data confirm a steep decline (UNODC 2023), yet methamphetamine output is now surging. Whether the ban will hold or yield to financial necessity remains uncertain. The drug economy is too deeply embedded to erase by decree.

Interlocking Rivalries: Everyone Against Everyone

The regional interests overlap and collide, creating a volatile equilibrium:

• U.S. vs. Russia: Washington views Afghanistan as leverage against Moscow’s grip on Central Asia; Russia counters through Taliban ties and coordination with China and Iran.
• U.S. vs. China: For Washington, Afghanistan is a wedge against China’s land corridors; Beijing responds with trade, not troops—and succeeds.
• India vs. Pakistan: India invests in infrastructure and uses Iran’s port to retain influence; Pakistan wields ISI networks and transit control.
• Iran vs. U.S.: Tehran systematically undercuts any U.S. presence, building networks among Shia and pragmatic factions.
• Regional Powers vs. Taliban: None officially recognize the Taliban, yet all engage them—Russia hosts, China mines, India aids, Iran negotiates, the U.S. keeps backchannels. The Taliban juggle these ties to maximize autonomy.

All parties play a zero-sum game: one’s gain is another’s loss. Afghanistan itself remains seldom the player—always the board.

What Trump’s Bagram Move Really Means

Against this backdrop, Trump’s declaration takes on far greater significance. A U.S. return to Bagram would not be an isolated tactical move but a strategic signal—to every regional player—that Washington seeks to reclaim its dominant role. China, Russia, Iran, and Pakistan would not sit idle. They would counter immediately—with weapons, with diplomacy, with money.

The outcome would not be stability, but a new round of the Great Game—fought once again on the backs of 40 million Afghans. The Taliban would return to guerrilla warfare, a fight they know how to wage. The West might win battles, but never the war. Two centuries of history prove one thing: Afghanistan can be occupied, but never controlled.

Outlook: Sovereignty or Chessboard?

Afghanistan stands again at a crossroads—one it has reached many times before, only to take the wrong turn, or to be forced down it by others. The country possesses everything needed for success: vast mineral wealth, a strategic position between Iran, Central Asia, China, Pakistan, and India, and a young population. Yet without internal unity and a legitimate political order capable of enforcing it, Afghanistan remains a chessboard rather than a player.

There is, in theory, an alternative to endless proxy war: a neutral status guaranteed by regional powers, modeled after Austria or Switzerland, combined with a development framework that trades resource concessions for investment in infrastructure, education, and healthcare. Under such a plan, Kabul would not beg for recognition—it would negotiate terms: access to copper and lithium in exchange for binding investments and collective security guarantees.

But this would require all sides—U.S., China, Russia, Iran, Pakistan, and India—to recognize Afghanistan as a sovereign actor, not an object of their ambitions. History shows that no great power has ever been willing to do that. The country’s location is too valuable, its resources too tempting, its rivalries too deep.

Trump’s Bagram gambit is thus more than a domestic political stunt. It is a test: will regional powers tolerate another U.S. military presence, or will they draw a red line? The Taliban have already answered. Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran will likely follow. What happens next depends on whether Washington is truly willing to risk a regional conflagration for one airbase.

Afghanistan—rich in resources and geopolitically pivotal—risks becoming the loser on its own board once again. Not because alternatives do not exist, but because none of the players seem willing to stop the game.

Sources

Reuters (2023): Reports on China’s mining interests in Afghanistan.
Al Jazeera (2023): Belt and Road discussions with Taliban authorities / Disputes over Helmand River water sharing.
Brookings Institution (2022): Security implications for Xinjiang.
Asia Society (2022): China’s gradualist approach to Taliban recognition.
Council on Foreign Relations (2019): Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan / (2018): Pakistan’s double game in Afghanistan.
BBC (2019): Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan / (2020): India’s infrastructure projects in Afghanistan.
Carnegie Moscow Center (2021): Russia’s Afghanistan policy.
The Diplomat (2021): India’s use of Chabahar port for Afghan trade / (2022): Iran’s Afghanistan strategy.
Hindustan Times (2022): India’s humanitarian aid to Afghanistan.
Observer Research Foundation (2022): India’s Afghanistan policy post-2021.
New York Times (2017): Iran’s ties with Taliban factions.
UNODC (2020, 2017, 2023): World Drug Reports / Afghanistan Opium Surveys.
Carnegie Endowment (2022): Iran’s pragmatic Afghanistan strategy.
Brookings (2021): Pakistan’s role in the Taliban’s rise.
Al Jazeera (2019, 2022): Afghanistan opium economy under U.S. watch / China eyes role in Afghan reconstruction.
SIGAR (2018): Counternarcotics Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan.
Reuters (2021): Russia hosts Taliban talks in Moscow.
Foreign Policy (2023): Afghanistan as the chessboard of great powers.
DW (2021): Pakistan’s “strategic depth” policy and Taliban ties.

Michael Hollister is a former European military professional with experience in Balkans peacekeeping operations. After a career transition into IT security, he now analyzes NATO expansion, European militarization, and Western interventions. His work challenges mainstream narratives on conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza, and beyond. Published at michael-hollister.com

© Michael Hollister — Redistribution, publication or reuse of this text is explicitly welcome. The only requirement is proper source attribution and a link to www.michael-hollister.com (or in printed form the note “Source: www.michael-hollister.com”).

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